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Abstract 
This thesis models the negotiation process between a country, composed by a central 
government (the principal) and one or two regions (the agents), and a multinational cor- 
poration (MNC) over the location of a new production plant. Because of non-verifiability 
and the fact that it has to set the taxes in advance (tax posting) the central government 
cannot tax-discriminate between different types of MNCs, but tax discrimination is pos- 
sible under the regional bargaining. The central government optimal policy is examined 
under three different regional negotiation mechanisms: bargaining, tax posting, and a 
mixed one (where the region can choose between using bargaining and tax posting). 
We first analyse the case where the country has only one region. On the one hand, we 
find that when the country gets an externality in addition to the tax over the MNC, it 
is not always the case that "bargaining with reservation price" dominates tax posting. 
Although in a different context this contrasts with Wang (1995) result, who does not 
allow for externalities. 
On the other hand, we find the striking result that, under a very feasible range of values 
(including the case when the MNCs only produce profits and no externalities to the host 
site) the country's welfare is higher in the bargaining mechanism than in the mixed one. 
For the regional choice over the negotiation mechanisms creates a conflict of interests 
between the region and the country. In particular, it is optimal for the country that the 
bargaining strategy is used but not for the region. 
Under the mixed mechanism context we also analyse inter-region competition. Interest- 
ingly, we find that the addition of a second identical region, which also operates under 
the mixed mechanism, resolves the problem produced by this conflict of interests. 
Then, we move on to analyse the case where two regional jurisdictions, both operating 
under the bargaining mechanism, compete for the attraction of the MNC. The existence 
of two regions potentially leads to excessive competition, favouring the MNC. The cen- 
tral government wants to limit the adverse effect on the country's welfare produced 
by such competition, but it cannot tax-discriminate between different types of MNCs. 
Among the main results we have the following two: First, the central government would 
use tax policy to create asymmetries even when the underlying structure is symmetrical. 
Second, there are situations where, even though one MNC is more productive in one 
region, it is optimal for the country to make it go to the other one. 
Thesis Supervisor: 
Title: Professor David de Meza 
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When a multinational corporation (MNC) has to decide where to build a new pro- 
duction plant, there are market and fiscal considerations that make one location more 
attractive than another. The MNC prefers the location where the difference between 
the profits it can obtain and the taxes it has to pay are positive and higher than the 
ones attainable in other locations. On the other hand, governments also want to at- 
tract MNCs' investment if they produce a positive payoff to their site (in terms of taxes 
collected and externalities generated). Indeed, it is well known that, in order to take 
advantage of positive externalities, governments are willing to offer subsidies with the 
aim of attracting new production plants to their territory. This results in MNCs holding 
simultaneous negotiations with different governments to find out which one offers the 
most profitable conditions for the installation of a new production plant. 
There is substantial evidence of this kind of subsidy competition. For example, 
in 1993 the state of Indiana packaged a $300 million deal to attract a United Airlines 
maintenance facility expected to create 6,300 jobs, while Kentucky issued $140 million in 
potential tax credits to attract 400 steel jobs (Wall Street Journal, July 6,1993). A sur- 
vey of regional incentives programs implemented in other OECD countries can be found 
in Chandler and Trebilcock (1986). There is also evidence that this inter-governmental 
competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) is quite common between municipali- 
ties, which enter 'bidding wars' using firm-specific agreements to attract plants (King, 
et al. (1993)). There is also an existing literature that. using different set-ups, models 
this subsidy competition to attract MINCs to particular locations. A comprehensive 
survey of it is done in chapter 2. 
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Thus far we have not been precise about which particular governments conduct these 
negotiations. However. as it is clear from the previous examples, the competition for 
new production plants is not just limited to be between countries. It is well known that 
the competition is even fiercer between regions of different countries as well as of the 
same country. 
In fact, in the present thesis we abstract from inter-country competition and con- 
centrate only on one country and its regions. The reason for proceeding in this way 
is the existence of some interesting issues in the way the surplus produced by a new 
production plant is divided between the host country and the MNC. Indeed, this as- 
sumption can be justified in those cases where a particular country has some market 
power in the world with respect to a particular MNC. This is equivalent to assume that 
the MNC produces a relatively higher surplus in the considered country than abroad. 
For example, a particular country could have a location and endowments very much 
appreciated by the MNC. In addition it could be the case that the externalities that 
the MNC produces in this country are higher than the ones produced elsewhere. To 
simplify we will assume throughout this thesis that the MNC produces certain positive 
surplus when it invests in the host country, which can be a combination of profits for the 
MNC and externalities to the host region, and zero surplus abroad. This assumption 
eliminates the problem of inter-country competition and simplifies the problem we want 
to address. 
This problem stems from the fact that to attract an MNC to a country both, the 
central and regional governments are involved in the negotiation process. That is, there 
are subsidies and/or taxes coming from both governmental levels. Thus, we model a 
game among an MNC, one central government and one or two regions. Our aim is 
to find out what is the optimal central government policy in order to maximise the 
expected country's welfare. 
Before moving on it is important to mention a persistent feature in the countries' 
negotiation process with the MNCs. Namely, the fact that the subsidies to attract 
MNCs are more frequently used by local rather than central governments. Indeed. it 
is rarely the case that the central governments bargain with the MNCs. rather regions 
often do so. This feature is obviously more common in big and relatively more federal 
countries. 
To highlight the importance of this practice we quote the following paragraph taken 
from the web page of the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy of South Korea. 
Lawmakers yesterday criticized the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy for lacking an efficient policy for attracting foreign direct investment 
in a more systematic manner. 
"It's true that foreign direct investment has been on the rise due to the 
recently launched series of government policies, but the ministry has failed 
to coordinate its different divisions and the provincial governments, " Kim 
Tae-Hong of the ruling Uri Party during the National Assembly's audit of 
the ministry. 
According to Kim, divisions under the Commerce Ministry seem to be 
competing for foreign direct investment, while the government is failing to 
join hands with provincial authorities, MOCIE Related News ( OCT. - 13 - 
2004). 
Still, why is there any role for the local governments to play? Had the central 
government perfect information it could just decide the right amount of subsidy or tax 
for the MNC and the regional government would play a very passive role or no role at 
all. So why is the regional government intervention so widespread and persistent? The 
framework developed in this thesis makes it easier to understand this stylised fact. This 
is particularly the case in the third and forth chapters, but a further understanding will 
be obtained in the fifth and sixth chapters when inter-regional competition is introduced. 
Another interesting feature is the fact that the central governments' taxes affecting 
MNCs are usually set very well in advance. Sometimes these are specific taxes for 
MNCs, but also some more general ones as the corporate and income taxes. The main 
reason for this practice is the existence of international treaties, which are also signed 
well in advance and put restrictions on the central government. 
The intention of the present thesis is to analyse what is the optimal central govern- 
ment policy in this particular setting. That is, a central government that has to set the 
taxes on the MNCs in advance and then the regions having freedom to set additional 
taxes or subsidies. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In chapter 2 we conduct a survey of the 
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literature on competition to attract -\I\Cs. The basic model is presented in chapters 
3 and 4. The main characteristic of these chapters is the existence of only one region. 
In chapter 3 two different regional negotiation mechanisms are considered: bargaining 
and posted tax. The existence of an established literature considering this issue in a 
seller-buyer context, determines the particular way in which we begin the introduction 
of this chapter. In chapter 4a mixed negotiation mechanism is added. One where the 
region is not limited to bargain or post a tax, but it can choose between these two 
mechanisms. In chapter 5 the competition between two regions is analysed, but only 
under the regional bargaining mechanism. In chapter 6 the competition between the 
two regions is analysed under the mixed regional negotiation mechanism. Chapter 7 
provides a general conclusion of the thesis. 
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In this section we write a literature review on the issue of inter-jurisdiction competition 
to attract MNCs. Janeba (1998) combines elements of strategic trade policy and capital 
income tax competition. He builds up a model in which the output market is imperfectly 
competitive and firms are internationally mobile. The owner of each of the two firms is 
a citizen of each of the two countries and initially has the firm located there. The firms 
produce a homogeneous good sold in a third market, but given that the production is 
indivisible any tax differential would produce a complete shifting of production to the 
most favourable country. The country's governments impose profit taxes on income 
generated in its own country (source taxation). There is no type of externality in play. 
The firms maximize their profits which only depend on their own and their competitor's 
output. The government's welfare is equal to the sum of the producer surplus of the 
domestic firm plus the levied taxes. Then, given that the locations are identical, the 
firms locate in the low-tax (high subsidy) country. Thus, the country offering the 
higher subsidy is the one attracting both firms, but this is at the cost of decreasing 
its tax revenue since part of the subsidy is given to the foreign firm. It is proved in 
the paper that a positive subsidy cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, there is also an 
incentive for the governments to undercut its neighbour's tax and therefore a positive 




Kind et al (2000) and Haaland and Wooton (1999) analyse tax competition for inter- 
nationally mobile firms in a general equilibrium model with spillover effects in the host 
country. The cause for the spillovers is the existence of vertical linkages between the 
production of monopolistic firms and the producers of other goods in the host country. 
In a "new economic geography" framework, Kind et al (2000) provide a general 
equilibrium model where capital, goods and firms are internationally mobile. They 
consider two symmetric countries with transport costs on trade flows between them. 
There are also two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. The latter is subject to 
increasing returns to scale and uses two inputs: labour which is immobile between 
countries, and capital. Capital movement from one country to the other does not imply 
migration of purchasing power, since income from capital is assumed to be consumed 
in the owner's country of residence. The existence of increasing returns to scale in the 
manufacturing sector will lead a firm to export its whole production from only one 
country. However, the migration of a single firm intensifies competition in the host 
country's product and labour markets, what has a negative effect on profits. There 
are two factors that counterbalance this centrifugal force. First, the existing firms will 
no more have to pay transport costs on their purchase of intermediates from the new 
entrant. Second, the domestic demand for intermediates in the host country will increase 
since the pool of firms has grown. These cost and demand linkages are self-reinforcing, 
and may dominate over the market competition effect and give rise to agglomeration of 
manufacturing. 
Kind et al focus on two situations: capital and firms may either, ex ante, be concen- 
trated in one single location, or they may be evenly spread between the two countries. 
On the one hand, if one of the countries already hosts an agglomeration advantage, 
it would be able to levy a positive tax on mobile firms in equilibrium. However, this 
tax should be low enough as to not to make it optimal for the firms to relocate to the 
other country. Indeed, since agglomerated firms are more competitive, they are able 
to pay a higher price for each unit of capital without making losses, what results in 
the supply of capital not being perfectly elastic even though it can move without cost 
between countries. This gives sustainability to the agglomerated equilibrium. On the 
other hand, in the symmetric equilibrium both countries will equally subsidize capital. 
11 
Haaland and \\ oton (1999) argue that the justification for subsidising foreign- 
owned MNCs is that they provide employment opportunities and generate demand for 
intermediate inputs produced by domestic firms. They use a general equilibrium model 
with two identical countries and three sectors: 1) a traditional sector; 2) a monopo- 
listically competitive domestic intermediate-goods' sector only selling its production to 
the foreign-owned MNCs; and 3) a final goods' sector composed by the MN Cs selling 
in a perfectly competitive market and providing knowledge spillovers to the domestic 
firms. In their model there are agglomeration benefits and costs for the MNCs. For the 
bigger is the domestic market size the more advantages are obtained from the increasing 
returns to scale in the monopolistically competitive intermediate sector, but the higher 
are the wages. 
Two main results are obtained from this model. On the one hand, if the agglomer- 
ation benefits are high enough all the modern sector ends up in one of the countries, 
but the necessary subsidies are so high that there are no net benefits for that country. 
Indeed, the subsidies are a transfer of income from owners of specific factors in the 
traditional sector both to domestic workers and to the foreign MNCs. 
On the other hand, if the agglomeration costs are strong enough to counteract the 
agglomeration benefits a stable diversified equilibrium appears with the vINCs evenly 
spread between the two symmetric countries. Indeed, there are still incentives for the 
countries to attempt to subsidise production in order to try to attract a larger share of 
the MNCs. However, under some parameter values the offered subsidies are so high that 
the winning country does not get any net benefit. Yet, as the equilibrium allocation of 
production is unaffected by the subsidy competition, this competition only results in a 
transfer of income from the two competing countries to the foreign MNCs. 
2.0.2 Tax competition between asymmetric countries 
In this literature, countries differ either by their exogenous wage level, their level of 
technology or their size. In general the result is that in equilibrium taxes are non-zero 
and countries may subsidize capital if it creates positive externalities. Furthermore, 
the more a country is at a priori disadvantage compared to the other one (in terms of 
technology or unemployment), the higher is the positive externalities it can gain from 
attracting the ýI\C. As a consequence the disadvantaged country is willing to offer a 
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higher bid than the other one, what makes it to attract the M1\ C and to catch up to 
a certain extent. We move on now to analyse three papers respectively dealing with 
wage, technological and size differences. 
Wage 
Haaparanta (1996) investigates a two stage subsidy game between two countries or 
regions which seek to attract exogenous inward foreign direct investment in order to 
alleviate domestic unemployment. The unemployment in the two locations in his model 
is explained by the existence of fixed wages. Then, differences in the exogenously de- 
termined national wage levels provide countries with unequal incentives to subsidize 
capital in order to lower their respective unemployment. Other characteristics of the 
model are that exports are not possible, the MNC can divide its production between 
the two locations and the subsidies depend on the amount of capital invested. 
In the first stage of the game, the governments maximize welfare which is defined 
as the labour income of their residents minus the subsidy. Indeed, since wages are 
fixed exogenously in both countries (creating unemployment), governments are only 
concerned with the employment effects of FDI. In the second stage of the game the 
MNC maximises its profits, which positively depends on the investment in each country, 
labour used, wage rate, market size, and subsidy. 
The results of the model show that subsidy competition alters the MNCs' location 
decision with respect to the no-subsidy case. Higher wage (higher unemployment) coun- 
tries will bid larger subsidies. Indeed, given that spatial externalities are ignored the 
results depend on the nature of the technology, and in particular on the elasticity of sub- 
stitution between labour and FDI. Finally, given that centrifugal forces (like transport 
costs) are not incorporated into the model, differences in market size do not affect the 
location decision of the multi-jurisdictional firm and are thus inessential for the optimal 
tax policies. 
Technology 
Furnagalli (2002) investigates the welfare consequences of subsidy competition for VI Cs 
in a context where the less technologically advanced region benefits more from the 
inward investment but, in the absence of incentives, the MNC's preferred location is the 
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other, more advanced region. 
Each of the regions hosts one local firm, and competes to attract the manufacturing 
plant of a producer from a third region (the i\1N C) . 
The SIN Cs problem is whether to 
build a plant in one of the two regions (and if so, in which one) or to export from the 
home region. She assumes the existence of the same transport cost between the host 
region and any of the host regions, but none between the two host regions. In the former 
case the MNC incurs a fixed set-up cost, while in the latter it has trade costs. When 
locating in a region, the MNC creates a positive externality in the form of lowering the 
production cost of the local firm. The intensity of this positive spillover depends on 
the level of technology in the region. That is, the spillovers are higher the larger is the 
technological gap between the domestic and the foreign firm. 
The model produces some interesting results. Thus, on the one hand, in the case that 
export is not an optimal option and there is no subsidy competition the MNC invests 
in the more advanced region. For the reduction of the local production costs induced 
by the technological spillover is lower in this region and thus the local firm becomes a 
less fierce competitor. On the contrary, in this same situation the existence of subsidy 
competition between the regions may switch the MNC's location to the less advanced 
region and so increase its welfare. It is obvious that the more advanced region's welfare 
would decrease, but the aggregate welfare for the two regions is not necessarily negative. 
On the other hand, in the case that export is the optimal option in the absence of 
subsidies the introduction of the subsidy competition will have two effects. That is, the 
MNC will be attracted to the integrated region and it will intensify the competition. 
The paper shows that if the "competition effect" is very detrimental to local firms 
(when trade costs from the MNC's home region are very high) any other positive effect 
associated with subsidies may be completely offset. This implies that the aggregated 
welfare of the two regions could be reduced even if they are extremely differentiated. 
By contrast, when trade costs are sufficiently low, the positive role of subsidies may be 
remarkably fortified. The aggregate welfare may increase, even if they are identical. 
Size 
Haufler and NN'ooton (1999) discuss the case of tax competition between two countries 
of different population size to attract the investment of a single third country MINC and 
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where export is not possible between the home and hosts countries. 
On the one hand, the profits of the MNC depend on the countries' size, level of 
transport costs. and selling price. Then, in the absence of any subsidy competition. the 
existence of scale economies combined with transport costs between the two countries 
give the MNC an incentive to locate in the larger country. On the other hand, in order 
to maximize the welfare of its representative household, each government is prepared 
to offer a subsidy in order to save transport costs. This results in the bigger country 
offering a higher subsidy than the smaller one, but the per capita cost of the subsidy 
is smaller. Obviously, the bigger country only needs to slightly over cut the smaller 
country subsidy to attract the MNC. 
Their conclusion is that when differences in country sizes are considered, the tax 
or subsidy competition does not change the investment profile which would have been 
settled in the no-subsidy case. For the foreign-owned monopolist always chooses to 
locate in the larger market. That is, competition has no positive effects and merely 
results in a waste of resources for the host countries. 
In a similar way, Barros and Cabral (2000) investigate the choice of location of a 
foreign-owned MNC between two countries of unequal size. However, the difference 
with Haufler and Wooton (1999) is that, these countries also differ by their level of 
unemployment. In particular, the shadow price of labour is lower in the smaller country. 
As a consequence, the employment gains that this country can extract from FDI are 
higher than for the larger country. The winning country will thus result from the 
interaction of these two factors: relative country size and employment gains. The MNC's 
profit in each location is a function of the country size, the government's subsidy to its 
marginal cost, and the transportation costs. As in Haufler and Wooton (1999), higher 
transportation costs favour the larger country. 
Furthermore, each country's objective function is to maximise the domestic welfare. 
On the one hand, the welfare of country i when the monopolist locates in country j is 
given by its consumers' surplus. On the other hand, if the MNC chooses to locate in 
country i, welfare is given by consumers' surplus minus total subsidies plus gains from 
employment creation. They do welfare comparisons between the equilibriums achieved 
by competitive subsidy, zero subsidy, and first-best subsidy. Interestingly, the paper 
shoyv that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero 
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subsidies. For the subsidy competition produces gains in terms of efficient location 
what may more than compensate the losses from higher subsidies granted to the foreign 
firm. 
Moreover, switching from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best sub- 
sidies (without side payments) produces gains to one country and losses to the other 
one. Here we only briefly analyse the comparison between subsidy competition and zero 
subsidies. Thus, it is obvious that the equilibrium welfare of the smaller country cannot 
be lower under the subsidy equilibrium than under the zero subsidy one. This is the 
case because without subsidies the home market bias would make the firm to locate in 
the larger country and so the introduction of subsidy competition has a negative effect 
on the welfare of the large country. For either it pays a subsidy to attract the MNC. 
or the latter locates in the smaller country. In this last case, the subsidy granted by 
the small country is not sufficiently high to compensate for the transportation costs 
it would have to pay. This result seems to explain why the subsidy competition is so 
persistent. For given that it produces gains to one country and losses to the other one, 
it may make difficult to reach a consensus to move away from it. 
2.0.3 Competition versus Cooperation 
Haufler and Wooton (2001) consider unilateral and regional tax policy for a region of 
two countries (A and B) that competes with a third potential-host country (C) for the 
location of a monopolistic MNC. The size of countries A and B are equal, but different 
from the size of country C. Moreover, transportation costs between A and B are lower 
than between the region and country C due to geographical proximity, administrative 
similarity, or other. 
In their paper they find that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of wel- 
fare gains for the countries undertaking the union (countries A and B in their paper). 
First, for investments that would have taken place in the union in the absence of co- 
ordination, the elimination of tax competition within the union leads to an increase in 
the equilibrium tax (or reduction in the equilibrium subsidy). This results in a transfer 
of location rents from the firm to the union. Second, for investments that would have 
not taken place in the union in the absence of coordination, a coordinated reduction in 
the union tax (or increase in subsidy) may attract the SIN C. resulting in an increase of 
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the regional welfare. In this last case, the objective of fiscal coordination is not only to 
avoid a waste of resources but also to present a united front in order to induce a MI\ C 
to locate a region which is part of the union. 
2.0.4 Dynamic models 
There are other models considering some dynamic issues in the inter-regional compe- 
tition for MNCs, but because they are not very much related to our paper we just 
give a very brief summary of some of the papers. For example, Bond and Samuelson 
(1986) and Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1984) model the fact that the tax competition 
between countries takes the form of a tax holiday. King and Welling (1992) examine a 
two-period model in which two regions compete simultaneously in each period. Compe- 
tition for foreign direct investment among asymmetric countries has been studied also 
in a dynamic menu auction framework by Besley and Seabright (1999). 
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Chapter 3 
Bargaining versus posted price 
selling 
3.1 Introduction 
Several selling mechanisms can be used by sellers in order to maximise their revenues. 
For instance they can choose between bargaining, posted price selling, and several types 
of auctions. The coexistence of these different methods suggests that none of them is 
optimal for all circumstances. However, what determines the use of one selling mech- 
anism instead of others? A significant amount of literature has intended to deal with 
this issue. One of the approaches to this optimal selection of selling mechanisms is a 
pair wise one and derives conditions under which one selling mechanism is better than 
another. Even though not all feasible selling mechanisms are compared, this approach 
does yield many intuitive conclusions on the coexistence and the relative advantages of 
different mechanisms. 
In the particular case of the comparison between bargaining and posted price selling 
two different settings have been analysed, a monopolistic and a multi seller one. Among 
others, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983), Wang (1995) and Arnold and Lippman (1998) have 
made important contributions to the monopolistic one. However, there is an important 
gap in this literature, which is the fact that the seller does not get any 'externality' from 
the buyer. The intention of the present chapter is to deal with this gap. In order to get 
a clear understanding of the effect produced by the introduction of this externality the 
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simplest possible setting will be used. which is the one of a monopolistic seller. 
The closest paper to our approach is Wang (1995). He finds that the relative cost 
of using bargaining versus posted price selling may explain which one is adopted. He 
assumes the cost of the former is higher than the latter because in the presence of 
bargaining the monopolist must hire a salesperson, who gets a fixed wage. In addition, 
when the seller adopts the bargaining mechanism he can commit to any reservation 
price. As it will be obvious later on, with some variation, this feature will also be 
present in our model. Wang himself states: 
If the seller chooses to bargain, he is able to discriminate (imperfectly) 
among buyers with different willingness-to-pay. However, additional employ- 
ees must be hired to mingle with the potential buyers. On the other hand, 
posting a fixed, non-negotiable price is simpler and cheaper. But discrimi- 
nation is then impossible. Therefore, the seller faces a trade-off: bargaining 
generates more revenues, but it costs more. 
However, even in the case that bargaining and posted price selling have the same 
cost, the former dominates the later in Wang's paper. 
In a heterogeneous-buyers setting we also compare bargaining with reservation price 
versus posted price selling, in terms of the seller's welfare' generated for a monopolistic 
'seller'. However, we rule out any difference in the relative costs of using bargaining 
and posted price selling. In this setting we find that it is not always the case that 
bargaining dominates posted price selling. We analyse this case in a framework where 
a multinational corporation (MNC, the buyer) has to pay a tax to a country (the seller, 
which may get externalities) in order to locate a new production plant. 
The principle behind both frameworks is the same: The selling of something, a good 
in the former and the site for a new plant in the latter. This is why we dedicated 
the first part of the introduction to discuss the seller-buyer framework that represents 
the focus of most existing literature. As it will become clear throughout the chapter, 
there are other features that are specific to the country-MNC framework. For that 
matter, we will use the more general terminology 'negotiation mechanisms' instead of 
'selling mechanisms'. For, depending on the parameter values, the country would be 
1 We refer to welfare and not just revenue because of the existence of the externality 
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the seller or the buyer and so it would have to choose between "selling" or "purchasing" 
mechanisms. As an extreme example, consider the case where a -'\I- 
\-C only produces 
externalities to the hosting country but does not get direct profits. In this case the 
MNC is selling these externalities to the country. Thus, the country will have to pay a 
price (i. e. subsidy) to the XINC to consummate the exchange. 
Following Wang (1995), we assume a principal-agent framework. Even though not 
essential, this setting facilitates the commitment power necessary for the seller to be 
able to set a reservation price (tax) in the bargaining mechanism. In our model, the 
principal is the central government of a country, who in order to maximise the expected 
country's welfare wants to attract the MNCs' production plant to the only region of the 
country (the agent). 
The assumption that only one region deals with the MNCs may still apply even if 
there are several regions involved. This might be the case if one region is naturally 
much more advantageous than the others. For instance, a region could be the only one 
in possession of a key industrial endowment (e. g. an oil source or a very well established 
financial hub). An example could be the city of Shanghai in China, which is becoming 
the most important financial hub of the south east of Asia. Thus, if an international 
bank or financial company has to choose a region in China, Shanghai would be certainly 
first in the menu of options. Furthermore, let us assume the only externality the MNC 
can produce is to the host region and not to any other region of the country. 
Both the central government and the region are able to set taxes (subsidies) on the 
MNCs. However, the central government moves first and sets a tax in advance to be paid 
by the MNC. In the case that the region can only bargain with the MNC, the central 
government tax would be equivalent to a "reservation tax". We posit that there are two 
types of MNCs and that types cannot be verified in a court of law. Non-verifiability 
and the fact that taxes have to be set in advance imply the central government cannot 
tax-discriminate between types. 
Regional intervention is analysed in two different scenarios. One in which it can 
only bargain with the MNCs the level of the regional subsidy/tax. We will refer to 
this as the "bargaining negotiation mechanism". A second scenario is one in which the 
region can post a subsidy/tax. It will be shown that this second case, referred to as 
"posted price mechanism", is equivalent to one where there is no regional (or central) 
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government and the 'MN C has to pay the central (or regional) government tax. In the 
case of the bargaining mechanism the region and the ZINC bargain in a second stage. 
However, in the case of posted price mechanism the region posts a tax in the second 
stage and the MNC chooses between coming to the region and paying the tax, or not 
coming. 
Let us move on now to summarise the main results of the chapter of which an 
important one stems from the comparison with Wang (1995) result. In order to avoid 
confusion with the terminology we make the comparison by referring to our framework. 
Thus, whenever there are externalities from the buyer to the seller it is not always 
the case that bargaining dominates posted-tax selling. However, in the special case 
where there is no externality Wang's result is replicated and the posted-tax mechanism 
dominates the bargaining one. Still, why is it the case that the existence of externalities 
can prevent the bargaining from being the dominant one? It must be pointed out 
that these externalities do not produce any qualitative change in the results under the 
bargaining mechanism, but they do under the posted-tax one. Indeed, the answer to 
the previous question is that in some situations the existence of externalities makes the 
latter mechanism relatively more advantageous. 
A clear example with a posted-tax mechanism relative advantage is one where the 
profits and externalities are such that the two MNCs produce different surpluses even 
though their profits are identical. Then, given that the posted-tax mechanism always 
sets the same tax on both MNCs, it permits the country to appropriate their entire 
surpluses. For, there is no negotiation with the MNCs about the externalities. On the 
contrary, given that the bargaining mechanism only allows "imperfect surplus discrim- 
ination" 2 between the two MNCs it would not be able to extract the entire surplus 
produced by both MNCs. Part of the externality produced by the high surplus MN C 
would have to pass from the region to the MNC in the form of subsidies. 
The previous example shows why the existence of externalities can prevent bargain- 
2Imperfect surplus discrimination is defined as the seller's ability of getting higher payoffs from the 
MNCs producing higher surpluses. This concept is introduced because, with the existence of external- 
ities, it is possible that under the bargaining mechanism optimal policy the high profit MNC pays a 
lower tax than the low profit one. Obviously, this is not what is conventionally understood by price 
discrimination. For instance. this is the case when an NINC only produces externalities and the other 
only produces profits, but the externalities are higher than the profits. Then, under the bargaining 
mechanism the high profit ZINC pays a lower tax than the low profit one. 
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ing from being the dominant one. However, let us go further and give a more clear 
intuition of what makes one mechanism relatively more advantageous than the other 
and vice versa. In order to do that let us first mention an advantageous feature of 
the bargaining mechanism. That is the fact that, when the two M YCs produce iden- 
tical surpluses, they are entirely appropriated by the country. However. because of 
the imperfect surplus discrimination, this advantage decreases with the dispersion of 
the surpluses. On the contrary, given that the posted-tax mechanism always sets the 
same tax on both MNCs, its advantageous feature is that, when the two SIN Cs produce 
identical profits, their entire surpluses are appropriated by the country. Though, this 
advantage decreases with the dispersion of the profits. 
Last but not least, our model provides clear policy recommendations. First, it 
determines the optimal central government tax policy for each negotiation mechanisms. 
Secondly, it establishes the optimal negotiation mechanism under specific ranges of 
parameter values, what is useful in the case the central government has some control 
over it. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the following section we give a more 
precise explanation of what we mean by 'externality'. In section 3 the distinction 
between the bargaining and posted-price outcomes is made. The way in which a central 
or regional government can impose these outcomes on an -XINC is also analysed. Section 
4 analyses the bargaining mechanism. Section 5 analyses the posted tax mechanism. 
In section 5 the comparison between the two mechanisms is made and the main results 
derived. Section 6 concludes. 
3.2 What we understand by externality 
The externalities produced by MNCs, which are also referred to as -productivity spillovers', 
can basically be divided into two types: technological and host-country-market spillovers. 
Perhaps the most important reason why countries try to attract FDI is the prospect 
of acquiring modern technology, interpreted broadly to include product. process, and 
distribution technology, as well as management and marketing skill. Foreign investment 
can result in benefits for host countries even if the I. NCs decide to carry out their foreign 
operations in wholly-owned affiliates, since technology to some extent is a public good. 
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We could think of the technological spillovers as when the entry or presence of ZINC 
affiliates lead to productivity or efficiency benefits in the host country's local firms, and 
the VIN Cs' are not able to internalize the full value of these benefits. The following 
paragraphs give three examples of these technological spillovers. 
First, local firms may be able to improve their productivity as a result of forward 
or backward linkages with MNC affiliates. In particular, they may imitate M. NC tech- 
nologies, or hire workers trained by MNCs. 
A second manifestation of these spillovers is the direct contact with technology users, 
which appears to be an important factor explaining technology diffusion. Before a new 
process or product innovation is widely spread in the market, potential adopters have 
limited information about the costs and benefits of the innovation and may therefore 
associate it with a high degree of risk. As the potential adopters come in contact with 
existing users, (e. g. MNC affiliates), information about the technology is diffused. The 
uncertainty regarding the pros and cons of the innovation is reduced, and the likelihood 
of adoption or imitation increases. In this way the introduction of new products or 
processes by MNCs may work as a good example of their profitability and so encourage 
local firms to also adopt them. 
A third source of potential benefit that foreign investment could produce on the host 
country can be characterised as `market access spillovers'. MNCs often possess strong 
competitive advantages in entering world markets, such as experience and knowledge of 
international marketing, established international distribution networks, and lobbying 
power in their home countries. As a result of their own export operations, MNCs 
may produce a contagious effect for local firms to enter the same export markets. For 
instance, they may create transport infrastructure or disseminate information about 
foreign markets that can be used also by local firms. 
Two other reasons why FDI can generate externalities to the host country are more 
host-country-market related: the creation of a more competitive host market and the 
somehow related one inspired in the `new economic geography'. Let us give a closer 
look to them. 
The main reason for the increase in competition as a result of foreign entry is that 
foreign affiliates have some characteristics not enjoyed by domestic firms. It is often 
the case that the entry by new domestic firms into specific industries in potential host 
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countries is likely to be difficult. There is general agreement that SIN Cs. are better 
equipped to overcome the entry barriers of those industries. The entry of SIN Cs into 
this kind of monopolistic industry is likely to increase the level of competition and force 
existing firms to become more efficient. But, foreign entry may, of course, also lead to 
a fall in the number of firms in the industry if the least efficient local companies are 
forced out of business. This raises the fear that foreign MNCs may out-compete all local 
firms and establish monopolies that are even worse than the domestic oligopolies they 
replace. Nevertheless, Caves (1971, p. 15) asserted that `whatever the market structure 
that results from the influence of direct investment, it can be argued that entry by a 
foreign subsidiary is likely to produce more active rivalrous behaviour and improvement 
in market performance than would a domestic entry at the same initial scale'. 
Finally, the recent economic geography literature, inspired by Krugman (1991), has 
provided an additional basis for thinking that there are externalities in the location 
of economic activity. They begin from Marshall's insight that location and production 
decisions of firms generate external effects on their host economies. In our context, factor 
and product market linkages are an important source of such externalities, as when a 
firm locates and thereby affects the market for skilled labour. Even though these are 
pecuniary externalities, government action (by taxes, subsidies or other means) can 
be justified if the economy is not otherwise first best. This is the case when there is 
imperfect competition or unemployment, not only in the particular industry to which 
the MNC belongs, but also in its upstream and downstream industries. In accordance 
with this literature the inter-jurisdiction competition for MNCs reflects the belief that 
history matters, that locational advantage, once gained, tends to perpetuate itself, in 
that way stressing the importance of agglomeration economies in industrial location. 
3.3 Distinction between the bargaining and posted-price 
outcomes 
We should mention that the only difference between the bargaining and posted-price 
outcomes is in terms of the welfare generated for the country as well as in terms of the 
regional payoff. That is. under some circumstances one negotiation mechanism produces 
a more or less country's welfare and/or payoff than the other. In the present thesis we 
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will focus our attention more on the side of the country's welfare than on the regional 
payoff. 
An interesting question is: how can each of these solutions (bargaining or posting 
tax) be imposed on the MNC? 
The posting tax mechanism: Throughout the thesis we assume that whenever the 
regional or central governments post a tax, this tax cannot be bargained by the NINC. 
This would possibly be the case when some commitment power is behind the posting 
tax mechanism. In particular we are thinking of the case where the Executive Power 
of the country (region) has no capability of changing the tax already passed by the 
country's (regional) congress. 
In order to give some intuition of how this commitment power can be put in place, 
let us exemplify with the case of the central government tax-posting. Arguably, the 
countries have to set the taxes well in advance to the time where particular MNCs show 
up, what usually needs parliamentary approval. The main reason for this practice is 
the existence of international treaties, which are also signed well in advance and put 
restrictions on the central governments tax manoeuvrability. 
The Executive Power of a country does not have discretion in order to change these 
taxes, particularly at the time an MNC shows up. To pass a new bill in order to change 
them is a cumbersome and costly process. Thus, it seems reasonable to think that at 
times the MNC does not have the possibility of bargaining the taxes. Moreover, it is 
obvious that this in-advance setting of taxes can also apply to the regions. 
The bargaining mechanism: On the contrary, it is sometimes the case that the 
governments, in particular the regional ones, have some degree of discretion in order to 
give relative privileges to some MNCs. That is, the regional congress gives the Executive 
Power more discretion in providing privileges to particular MNCs. These privileges 
take, among others, the following forms: payroll tax credits, tax breaks, property tax 
abatements, low interest loans etc. As noticed by Davies R. B. (2004) these privileges 
are generally firm-specific. 
Thus, whether the regional government has or not discretion with respect to the 
taxes charged to specific MNCs the mechanism in place will be a bargaining or a posting 
tax one. 
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3.4 The bargaining mechanism 
In this section we look at a mechanism where the region has no capability of posting 
a tax and so its only choice is to bargain with the MNCs. We assume a two-stage 
game involving the central government, one region, and an ZINC. In the first stage, 
the central government determines the lump sum tax to be imposed on the SIN C3 in 
order to maximise the expected country's welfare, which is equal to the local payoff 
(externality plus regional tax) plus the central government tax. In the second stage, 
the MNC bargains with the regional government on the level of the lump sum tax to 
be paid by the MNC4 5. The regional government maximises its own payoff, which is 
equal to the externality produced by the MNC plus the regional tax6. Suppose that, 
in this stage of the game all the players have perfect information. This means that the 
externality produced by the MNC, the tax imposed by the central government in the 
first stage of the game, and the payoff that the MNC obtains if it does not invest in the 
country are common knowledge. For simplicity, the later is assumed to be zero. 
To model the bargaining process between the MNC and the region we use a Rubin- 
stein framework (Rubinstein 1982). In our context, this bargaining framework works like 
this. The MNC and the region bargain over the partition of a cake of size s, the "after- 
: 'Whether the central government tax is on the I\INC or on the region does not make any difference 
in terms of the payoff the MNC and the region get in the bargaining mechanism. 
The choice of this particular setting is based on the fact that it is more common to see the re- 
gions, and not the central governments, bargaining with the MNCs. Some evidence of this can be 
found in Chandler and Trebilcock (1986) and Krause (1998). Furthermore, the central government 
pre-commitment to taxes is sometimes originated in tax treaties signed well in advance. Finally, for 
simplicity we assume that the central government cannot prevent the regional subsidies. The main 
justification for this is that the subsidies can take different forms like infrastructure or other concessions 
to the MNC, which sometimes are very difficult to be identified as subsidies. 
5 Bargaining is an appropriate framework to analyse this kind of problem because this is the most 
common way the MNCs induce different regions to compete for their production plants. Most of the 
literature uses an auction framework, which is less obviously applicable. Furthermore, we assume here 
that the regional government cannot pre-commit to subsidies (or taxes) as the central government does 
it. The main justification for this assumption is the fact that an MNC would more easily accept a pre- 
commitment if it is imposed by a third party (in this case the central government) than if it is imposed 
on itself by the region and so it is more readily renegotiated. Thus, we could say that the central 
government is a very good commitment tool for the regions. The existence of regional pre-commitment 
capability is considered in the next section. 
We are assuming that the regional government does not consider the central government tax revenue 
in its own utility function. Obviously, this is not necessarily a realistic assumption if the way the central 
government expends this tax revenue results in higher benefits for the region attracting the ZINC. 
However, one justification for assuming that can be the existence of a large number of regions in the 
country, but only one being able to attract the : ZINC. If this were the case, this last region would get 
negligible benefits from this central government tax revenue. Indeed, the central government can spend 
this tax revenue in a way that only increases the utility of the regions that are not involved in attracting 
the MNC. 
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tax surplusi' (where s> 0) according to the following, alternating-offers. procedure. At 
time 0 the MNC makes an offer to the region. An offer is a proposal of a partition of the 
cake. If the region accepts the offer, then agreement is struck and the players divide the 
cake according to the accepted offer. On the other hand, if the region rejects the offer, 
then it makes a counteroffer at time 0>0. If this counteroffer is accepted by the SIN C. 
then agreement is struck. Otherwise, the MNC makes a counter-counteroffer at time 
20. This process of making offers and counteroffers continues until a player accepts an 
offer. If the players discount rate are identical and 0 -f 0, in the only subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game they divide the cake half and half. Indeed, the agreement is 
immediately reached. In other words, the result of this bargaining framework in the 
present context is that the region and MNC payoffs are equal to half of the after-tax 
surplus produced (i. e. externality minus central government tax). 
The simplest case is when there is only one type of MNC. On the one hand, in 
the absence of central government intervention, the region will only appropriate half of 
the externality produced by the MNC. On the other hand, in the presence of central 
government intervention, it is optimal for it to charge the MNC a tax equal to the 
externality it produces. Then, the benefit of the externality is totally appropriated by 
the country. 
However, it is usually the case that regions have to negotiate with more than one 
type of MNC. Then, industrial, technological, as well as, financial characteristics may 
produce differences in the externalities created by each type of MNC. To consider this 
we allow the existence of two types of MNCs (i. e. a or b), which can produce different 
externalities. Furthermore, it is appropriate to think that since the taxes are set in 
advance, it is difficult for the central government to `tax-discriminate' between the two 
types of MNCs. That is, it cannot set the tax conditional on the MNC's type8. This 
feature is captured by assuming that it knows the externality each type of MNC can 
produce, but it does not know the realisation of the MNC type. In particular, it only 
' The "after-tax surplus" is defined as equal to the surplus (i. e. externality plus the gross profit the 
NINC gets by investing in the region) minus the central government tax. 
5In fact, this is a simplifying assumption because it would be enough to just assume an imperfect 
central government tax discrimination. Indeed, the fact that the central government cannot tax dis- 
criminate between the two types of MNCs can be justified by assuming that the type of NEW is a 
non-verifiable variable. This ultimately means that a tax scheme conditional on types is unfeasible be- 
cause it cannot be enforced in a court of law. Latter on we will also suggest an alternative explanation 
for the impossibility of implementing in advance tax discrimination. 
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knows that an M_ NC of type a shows up with probability p and an '-\I- -'C of type 
b does 
it with probability 1-p. On the contrary. at the time a particular '-\I- \-C shows up all 
the players know the MNC's type. 
Again, in the decentralised solution (the one without central government interven- 
tion), the region will only appropriate half of the externality produced by each type of 
MNC. However, what is the result of the game if the central government intervenes by 
setting taxes in advance? This is the question we now pass to answer. 
Thus far we have assumed that the MNCs do not have any profit. However, given 
that the addition of MNCs profits makes the model a more general one without increas- 
ing its complexity, hereafter we will do so. Then, the surplus that an MNC of type i 
produces (si) is equal to the sum of its profit and the externality (7ri and ei respectively). 
Some terminology: Before moving on lets clarify some of the terminology that will 
be used hereafter. Thus, y, z, w, ez and ew will refer to the NIN C's payoff, the regional 
payoff, the country's welfare, the expected regional payoff and the expected country's 
welfare respectively. In addition, we will use subscripts to refer to the MNCs being 
attracted (i. e. a, b, or a, b), and upper scripts to refer to the negotiation mechanisms 
(b and p for the bargaining and posted tax mechanisms respectively). In the following 
chapter we will also refer to the 'mix-negotiation mechanism' with the upper script 
m. Indeed, in that case the upper script will also refer to the particular implemented 
strategy. That is, (m, b) and (m, p) when the bargaining and posting tax strategies 
respectively are implemented under the mix-negotiation mechanism. 
We begin solving the second stage of the game by making the following definition, 
where g represents the central government tax. When an MNC of type i (i = a, b) shows 
up and the after-tax surplus is higher or equal than the surplus abroad (i. e. Si -g> 0). 
the region would get the MNC of type i. For simplicity we assume that if the previous 
weak inequality were satisfied with an equal sign the MNC would come to the country 
with probability 1. Then, the equilibrium payoff for the MNC is: 
bs ifst>g Yi = (3.1) 
0 otherwise 
Thus, if the region gets the ýI\C of type i (i. e. the first line of expression 1 applies) 
the MN-C's payoff would be equal to half of the after-tax surplus an MI\ C of type i 
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produces in the region. On the contrary, if the central government tax is such that the 
after-tax surplus in the region is lower than the surplus abroad the -\I- 
-\-C does not come 
to the country and it gets a payoff of zero. 
It is obvious that the tax that the region must charge is such that, the MC gets 
the payoff in expression 3.1. Thus, the equilibrium regional tax is: 
b g) -S 




Again, if the central government tax is too high the MNC does not come to the 
country and the tax effectively paid is equal to zero. In the upper part of expression 3.2 
it is like if the region takes the full after-tax profit (7ri - g) from the MNC, but then it 
compensates the MNC by giving back the payoff in expression 3.1. Notice that ti can 
be negative (i. e., a local subsidy) and often this is the case9. 
Then, by adding the equilibrium tax in expression 3.2 to the externality in the region 




zi = (3.3) 
0 otherwise 




'9b2 g (1-p) if 3b<g (3.4) 
0 otherwise 0 otherwise 
We have already determined all the important analytical expressions of the second 
stage of the game. In the first stage the central government maximises the expected 
country's welfare. Given that the ex-post country's welfare produced by each particular 
type of MNC that builds a plant in the country is equal to the central government tax 
plus the regional tax and the externality. Thus, by adding g to expression 3.3, the 
'ex-post' country's welfare is 
`'As an example, think of the case where there is no central government tax and no profit (the surplus 
is just equal to the MINC's externality ). Then, for the region to get half of this surplus, it has to give a 





st2 if sj g 
wi= (3.5) 
0 otherwise 
and the expected (ex-ante) country's welfare under the bargaining mechanism is 
(g+sa )pif sa>g (g+sb2 g) P) if Sb >- 9 (3.6) 
0 otherwise 0 otherwise 
To have a better understanding of the bargaining mechanism let's see how it works 
by using a numerical example. 
Example 1 Assume the surpluses the MNCs produce are 8a = lra = 40 and Sb = Ira = 
30. Then, given the existence of two MNC types and one region, there are only two 
alternatives for the central government: 1) to only attract the MNC of type a; or 2) to 
attract both types of MNCs. Obviously, it is not possible to only attract an MNC of type 
b. For every central government tax that attracts an MNC of type b will also attract an 
MNC of type a. 
An easy way of searching for the optimal regional policy is to first obtain the optimal 
central government tax in each of these two alternative cases (i. e. conditional opti- 
mums). Then, for each specific parameter values, the conditional optimum producing 
the highest expected country's welfare is the unconditional optimal policy. Let us then 
find first the conditional optimums. 
Thus, in the case of only attracting the MNC of type a the optimal central government 
policy is to set g= 40. Then, t=0 is the optimal regional subsidy to attract an MNC 
of type a10. The MNC and the region get no payoff and the country's welfare is equal 
to the central government tax. Thus, given that for g= 40 the MNC of type b does 
not come to the country, the expected country's welfare derived from expression 3.6 is 
ewä =sap = 40p. 
In the case of attracting both MNCs, the optimal central government policy is to set 
g= 30. Then, when an AINC of type b shows up the after-tax surplus is equal to zero 
and there is nothing to be shared between the region and the MNC. Both the region and 
10 The region cannot set a tax higher than zero. For it would make the MNC to hale a negative net 
profit. 
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the MNC get no profit and the expected country's welfare is equal to the central gov- 
ernment tax times the probability of this MNC showing up (i. e. g(1 - p) = Sb (1 - p)). 
On the contrary, when an MNC of type a shows up the bargaining between the region 
and the MNC for the after-tax surplus of 10 results in a regional tax of 5. Thus, the 
expected country's welfare is equal to the addition of the central government tax plus 
the part of the after-tax surplus kept by the region" multiplied by the probability of this 
MNC showing up (i. e. ew = (30 + 5) p= 35p). 
Thus, the analytical expressions for the country's welfare derived from 3.6 are: 
b 
ewa =8 ap 
when only the MNC of type a is attracted and 
ew 
b 
b= Sb -+- a, 





when both MNC types are attracted. 
Then, from the comparison of the expected country's welfare in expressions 3.7 and 
3.8 we get that it would be optimal to only attract the MNC of type a if and only if sa 
and p are high enough as to satisfy the following inequality 
2-p 
Sa > sb 
p 
(3.9) 
On the contrary, if the inequality in expression 3.9 is not satisfied it would be optimal 
for the country to attract both MNCs, and an equality would mean to leave the country 
indifferent between the two policies. 
3.5 The posted tax mechanism 
In this section we look at a mechanism where the region has no bargain capability and 
so its only choice is to post a tax. This case is interesting for two reasons. First, as an 
intermediate step in order to arrive to the most general one where the region can choose 
"Because the MNC only produces profits and no externality to the region the after-tax surplus kept 
by the region is just equal to the regional tax. 
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between bargaining and posted tax ('mixed mechanism'). Second, to better understand 
the difference between this last more complex mechanism and the bargaining one. 
Moreover, it is sometimes the case that the setting of taxes in advance is the only 
instrument in the region's hands. For sometimes regional governments do not find easy 
to bargain with MNCs. A justification for that could be the same one we have mentioned 
for the central government inability to bargain. That is. the existence of treaties signed 
in advance, which impose the necessity of the taxes to be also set in advance. However, 
some other reasons will be mentioned in the results section of this chapter. 
Furthermore, as it is the case for the central government, under the posted tax 
mechanism the regional government cannot tax-discriminate between the two types of 
MNCs. That is, it cannot set the tax conditional on the MNC's type. This feature is 
captured by assuming that it knows the externalities and profits each type of MNC can 
produce, but it does not know the realisation of the MNC type. Again, the justification 
for this assumption is the fact that the type of MNC is a non-verifiable variable. This 
ultimately means that a tax scheme conditional on types is unfeasible because it cannot 
be enforced in a court of law. 
Let us continue assuming the existence of only one region and two MNCs, a and b. 
Until now it did not make any difference whether the MNCs surpluses were composed 
by profits, externalities,. or a combination of the two. However, as it will be obvious 
later on, in the posted tax mechanism the composition of the surplus can be important. 
Assume again that the surpluses produced by the two MNCs are sQ, = 7Ta + ea and 
Sb = 71b + eb respectively. 
Thus, in the present section we deal with a three stage game. In the first stage the 
central government sets a lump sum tax g. In the second stage the region sets a lump 
sum tax t. Finally, in the third stage an MNC shows up and decides whether to locate 
or not in the region. In the case it locates in the region it has to pay both the regional 
and central governments taxes, but no bargaining takes place. 
Third stage of the game: When an MNC of type i (i = a, b) shows up and the 
after-tax profit12 is higher or equal than the INC's payoff abroad (i. e. iri -g-t> 0). 
the region gets the MNC of type i. Where g and t are the central government and 
"Under the posted tax mechanism the after-tax profit is equal to the NIC's gross profit minus both 
the central and regional government taxes. 
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regional taxes respectively. For simplicity we are assuming that if the previous weak 
inequality were satisfied with an equal sign the SIN C would come to the country with 
probability 1. Then, the equilibrium payoff for the SIN C is: 
ýi-g-tif7r -g-t>0 (3.10) yp = 
0 otherwise 
Thus, if the after-tax profit (i. e., 7ri -g- t) in the region is higher than the MNC 
can get abroad, the MNC of type i comes to the country and gets the payoff in the first 
line of expression 1. Otherwise, the MNC does not come to the country and it gets a 
payoff of zero. 
Second stage of the game: In the case the MNC of type i is attracted the 
regional tax must be such that the MNC gets at least the payoff in expression 3.10 (i. e.. 
t< 7ri - g). Then, the ex-post regional payoff from an MNC of type i is: 
zp = 
t+ ei if ire -g-t>0 
0 otherwise 
(3.11) 
and the expected regional payoff is 
ez 
(t+ea, )pif 7i-g-t>0 
+ 
(t+eb)(1-p) if 7i-g-t>0 (3.12) 
0 otherwise 0 otherwise 
Obviously, the optimal regional tax is the one maximising expression 3.12. Given 
that there are two types of MNCs there are three possible strategies for the region in 
order to maximise 3.12: to attract both types of MNCs (i. e., a and b) or only one 
type (i. e., a or b). Then, the simplest way of finding the regional optimal tax is to 
first find the regional "conditional optimal taxes". By conditional optimal taxes we 
mean the regional optimal taxes conditional on one of the mentioned three strategies 
being adopted. Then, the conditional optimal tax providing the highest regional payoff 
will be the unconditional regional optimal tax (or simply regional optimal tax). The 
conditional optimal tax is13 
13For simplicity we assume that if no MINC is attracted t` = 0. 
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tc_ 
min (71a - g, 7rb - g) if both SIN Cs are attracted. 
max (era, - g, 7rb - g) if only the high profit M1\ C is attracted, 
0 if no XINC is attracted 
Then, the optimal regional tax is 
V= arg max 
(tC + ea) p if 7ri -g- tC >0 





First stage of the game: Given the optimal regional tax we can find the ex-post 
country's welfare from an MNC of type i by just adding the central government tax to 





and the expected country's welfare is 
ewp 








Let us begin assuming that there is no central government or that the central gov- 
ernment sets a tax g=0. It will be obvious later on that g=0 is an optimal central 
government tax in this setting. 
Then, as we already mentioned, given the existence of two MNC types and one 
region, there are three possible strategies that can be followed by the region. That 
is: 1) to only attract the MNC of type a; 2) to attract both types of INCs, or 3) to 
only attract the MNC of type b. Here we see the first difference with respect to the 
bargaining mechanism. That is, the fact that under the posted tax mechanism it is 
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possible to only attract the MN -C of type b. Indeed, we will soon see that this tax policy 
can be also the equilibrium one for the country. 
Thus, an easy way of searching for the optimal regional policy is to first obtain the 
optimal regional tax for each of these strategies (i. e. conditional optimums). Then, 
for each specific parameter values, the conditional optimal tax producing the highest 
expected country's welfare is the unconditional optimal tax. The conditional optimal 
taxes, the conditional expected regional payoffs, and the conditional country's welfare 
are obtained in the following three propositions. 
However, before moving on lets clarify some of the terminology that will be used 
hereafter. By now we know that ez and ew refer to the expected regional payoff and the 
expected country's welfare respectively. In addition, we will use subscripts to refer to 
the MNCs being attracted (i. e. a, b, or a, b), and upper scripts to refer to the negotiation 
mechanisms (b and p for the bargaining and posted tax mechanisms respectively). In 
the following chapter we will also refer to the mix negotiation mechanism with the 
upper script m. Indeed, in that case the upper script will also refer to the particular 
implemented strategy. That is, (m, b) and (m, p) when the bargaining and posting tax 
strategies respectively are implemented under the mixed negotiation mechanism. 
Proposition 2 When there are two types of MNCs, one region that can only post a tax, 
and no central government intervention (or a zero central government tax), an MNC of 
type a can be the only attracted one if and only if Ira > 7rb. Moreover, the conditional 
optimal regional tax that only attracts an MNC of type a is t= max (Ira - 9,7rb - 9) - 
ýTa 
Then, when only the MNC of type a is attracted, we get from 3.12 that the expected 
regional payoff, which is equal to the expected country's welfare, is14: 
ezä = ewä = SaP if Ira > 71b (3.17) 
Proof. It is obvious that a tax higher than t= 7ro, does not attract any M\ C and a 
lower one produces a lower expected country's welfare than the one in expression 3.1; 
"It is obvious that in the case that the central government sets a tax g=0 the regional payoff would 
be equal to the country's welfare. For, the country's welfare is equal to the regional payoff plus the 
central government tax. 
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or attracts both MNCs.   
Another proposition is: 
Proposition 3 When there are two types of MNCs, one region that can only post a 
tax, and no central government intervention (or a zero central government tax). the 
conditional optimal regional tax attracting both types of MNCs is t= min (Ira, erb) . 
Then, from 3.12 we get that the expected regional payoff, which is equal to the 
expected country's welfare, is: 
ezä b= ewä b= min 
(Ira, 7b) + ea) p+ min (Ira, 71b) + eb) (1 - Pý 3.18) 
Proof. It is obvious that a tax higher than t= min (Ira, 7rb) does not attract both 
MNCs and a lower one produces a lower expected country's welfare than the one in 
expression 3.18.   
Another proposition is: 
Proposition 4 When there are two types of MNCs, one region that can only post a 
tax, and no central government intervention (or a zero central government tax), an 
MNC of type b can be the only attracted one if and only if 7rb > lra. Moreover, to 
only attract an MNC of type b is the unconditional optimal policy under some pa- 
rameter values and, when this is the case the unconditional optimal regional tax is 
t= max (71a - g, 'b - 9) = 7b. 
Then, from 3.12 we get that the expected regional payoff, which is equal to the 
expected country's welfare, is: 
3.19) ezb =ew=Sb (1-p) if 71b>Ira 
Proof. In the following numerical example we show that t= 71b is the unconditional 
optimal regional tax only attracting the MNC of type b. 
That is, assume the MNCs of type a and b produce externalities of ea = 40 and eb = 20 
respectively and profits of Ira = 20 and 7rb = 30 respectively (i. e. Sa = 60 and Sb = 50), 
and p=0.1. Then, given that Ira < 30, it is obvious that setting t= Sb = 30 would be 
the conditional optimal tax only attracting the type b's ZINC. Note that, a regional tax 
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higher than t= 7rb = 30 would not attract the ýI\C of type b and, given that g=0. a 
lower one would reduce the expected country's welfare or attract both ýI\Cs. 
Moreover, the expected country's welfare is higher under this policy (equal to 45 in 
expression 3.19) than under the one that only attracts the type a SIX C (equal to 6 in 
expression 3.17) and the one attracting both 'NINC (equal to 42 in expression 3.18).   
In the previous three propositions we have determined the optimal taxes for the 
region conditional on each particular match between region and MNC being achieved. 
Then, for each specific parameter values, the conditional optimum producing the highest 
expected country's welfare is the unconditional regional optimal policy. In order to find 
it a comparison between the expected country's welfare in expressions 3.17,3.18, and 
3.19 is necessary. 
Not surprisingly, the region can find it optimal to attract both MNCs or to only 
attract the MNC of type a. However, given the results under the bargaining mechanism, 
it is no so obvious why it can be optimal and even possible to only attract an MNC of 
type b. We have just used a numerical example to justify why this can be the case under 
the present mechanism. However, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding 
of this result we look at it in some more detail. 
First, it should be obvious that for this case to be an equilibrium it is necessary 
that the maximum tax an MNC of type b can pay is higher than the one the MNC of 
type a can pay (i. e. lrb > 7ra). For, if this were not the case every tax accepted by an 
MNC of type b would also be accepted by an MNC of type a, and the two MNCs would 
be attracted. Indeed, given that this condition is satisfied, it would be optimal to only 
attract an MNC of type b only if the expected country's welfare in expression 3.19 were 
higher or equal than the ones in expressions 3.17 and 3.18. That is, when the following 







7rb(1 -P) >71a+eap (3.21 
\N e have already determined the regional optimal policy assuming that there was no 
central government intervention or that the central government imposed a zero tax on 
the M. C. However, in the case that there is a central government: Would a tax g=0 
JI 
be an optimal one? And, if this were the case, would this tax be the only optimal one'? 
Let us prove that the answer to the first question is an affirmative one. On the one hand, 
it is obvious that when the country only attracts one type of '-\I. NC this is an optimal 
policy. For, in this case it would be optimal for the region to sets t= Ira (t = erb), 
what would allow the region to appropriate the entire surplus produced by the ZINC. 
On the other hand, this is also an optimal central government policy when the country 
attracts both MNCs types. For, the combination g=0 and t= min (Ira, erb) charges 
the highest possible tax that would be accepted by both MNCs and it also extracts the 
entire externality produced by both of them. 
Let us move on now to answer the second question. That is: Is g=0 the only 
optimal central government tax? The answer to this question is no. To prove that this 
is the case it is enough to look at the strategy only attracting the MNC of type a. Given 
that this is the optimal strategy for the country, the central government could charge 
any tax -00 <g< Ira. Then, the optimal regional tax is t= era - g, what implies that 
the total tax paid by the MNC is g+t= Ira. 
Let us move on now to analyse an interesting case, which provides the same result as 
in the previous setting. This case is one where, given the central government in advance 
setting of taxes, the region can neither use the bargaining nor the posted tax mechanism. 
This would perhaps be the case of some municipalities and local governments with very 
low levels of autonomy and capability of making any important decision. Then, the 
following proposition applies: 
Proposition 5 When there are two types of MNCs and one region the expected coun- 
try's welfare is the same in the following three cases: a) the central government can 
only post a tax and the region can neither post a tax nor bargain, b) the region can only 
post a tax and the central government can neither post a tax nor bargain, and c) both 
can only post a tax. 
In virtue of the previous proposition, from now on the expression "posted tax mech- 
anism" will refer to any of these three cases. 
An interesting result under the posted tax mechanism appears when, given g=0, 
it is optimal to attract both INCs. We know from proposition 3 that in this case the 
optimal regional tax is t= min (Ira, 7rb). Then, it can be the case that the ex-post 
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wä, b 48.96 33 54 
Figure 3-1: Numerical example: the ex-post regional payoff from the high surplus MNC 
is lower than the one from the low surplus MNC 
payoff the region gets from an MNC of type a (i. e. min (Ira, ? fb) + ea) is lower than the 
one it gets from an MNC of type b (i. e. min (Ira, erb) + eb). This is an interesting result 
because it never happens in the bargaining mechanism. The intuition of this result is 
very straightforward. Given that in the tax posting mechanism the tax charged to a 
MNC does not vary with its type, the only difference between the ex-post payoff the 
region gets from both MNCs come from the externalities. Thus, the ex-post payoff 
the region gets will be higher from the MNC producing the higher externality and not 
necessarily the one producing the higher surplus. Let us see this result in the following 
numerical example. 
Example 6 Assume the MNCs of type a and b produce externalities of ea =1 and 
eb = 22 respectively and profits of Ira = 57 and erb = 32 respectively (i. e. sa = 58 and 
sb = 54), and p=0.24. Figure 3-1 shows the expected country's welfare produced by 
the three alternative policies under the posted tax mechanism and the ex-post payoffs the 
region gets from each of the MNCs under the policy attracting both MNCs. It is obvious 
that the optimal policy is to attract both MNCs and that the ex-post payoff the region 
gets from an MNC of type a is lower than the one it gets from an MNC of type b. 
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3.6 Comparison between the bargaining and posted tax 
mechanisms 
In the previous two sections we have identified, for each negotiation mechanism, the 
optimal tax policies under different parameter values. We saw that. on the one hand, 
to only attract the MNC of type a or both MNCs are the only alternatives under the 
bargaining mechanism and the expected country's welfare for these two strategies are 
given by expressions 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. On the other hand, to only attract an 
MNC (of type a or b) or both MNCs are the alternatives under the posted tax mechanism 
and the expected country's welfare for these three strategies are given by expressions 
3.17,3.19 and 3.18 respectively. 
In this section we want to make a comparison between the bargaining and posted 
tax mechanism. In particular, we want to answer the following question: Under what 
parameter values does one negotiation mechanism provide a higher expected country's 
welfare than the other one? In order to get an answer to this question we first need 
to obtain some intermediate results. These intermediate results, which are shown in 
propositions 7 and 9 and definition 8, come from the comparison of the expected coun- 
try's welfare obtained under each of the possible alternatives in each mechanism. Then, 
the answer to the previous question is in propositions 10 and 11. 
Proposition 7 ewä = ewä. 
Proof. From the comparison of expressions 3.7 and 3.17.   
An obvious implication of the previous proposition is that when in both mechanisms 
it is optimal to only attract an MNC of type a the expected country's welfare is the 
same under both mechanisms. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we make the following 
definition: 
Definition 8 ewa, = ewä = ewä. 
Proposition 9 ewä 6> ewb . 
Proof. From the comparison of expressions 3.8 and 3.19.   
An implication of the last proposition is that when it is optimal to only attract 
the I\INC of type b under the posted tax mechanism, this mechanism provides a lower 
expected country's welfare than the bargaining one. 
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Now we are in conditions to determine under what parameter values one negotiation 
mechanism provides a higher expected country's welfare than the other one. This is done 
in the following four propositions. 
Proposition 10 The bargaining mechanism strictly (weakly) dominates the posted tax 
one if and only if ewä b> (>) max 
(ewa. 
ewä b) . 
Proof. The bargaining mechanism strictly dominates15 the posted tax one only 
when max 
(ew, 
ewa bI> max 
(ew, 
ewb , ewä bI what, given 
that ewa = ewä = ewa 
and ewä b> ewb , is equivalent to ewä b> max (ewa, ewä b)   
Proposition 11 The posted tax mechanism strictly (weakly) dominates the bargaining 
one if and only if ewä b> max 
(ewa, 
ewa, b 
Proof. The posted tax mechanism strictly dominates16 the bargaining one only 
when max 
(ew, 
ewb , ewä b) > max 
(ew, 
ewa b) what, given that ewä = Map = ewa 
and ewä b> ewb 
is equivalent to ewä b> max I ewa, ewä, b) .  
From the previous propositions the following two corollaries are derived. 
Corollary 12 when to attract both MNCs is the optimal policy under one mechanism, 
but the attraction of only one MNC is the optimal policy under the other one, the 
mechanism for which it is optimal to attract both MNCs strictly welfare dominates the 
other one. 
Corollary 13 A necessary condition for a mechanism to strictly dominate the other 
one is that the attraction of both MNCs is the optimal policy under the former. Indeed, 
a sufficient condition for a mechanism to strictly dominate the other one is that the 
attraction of both MNCs is the optimal policy under the former and this policy provides 
a higher expected country's welfare than the attraction of both MNCs under the latter. 
Before giving a more formal explanation of what makes one mechanism relatively 
more advantageous than the other let us begin with some intuition. Thus, let us first 
mention a relative advantage of the bargaining mechanism. That is the fact that, 
''The proof for the week domination is the same but the strict inequalities are replaced by weak ones, 
. except for u'a, b > "'b 
16 See previous notE'. 
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when the two \'IN Cs produce identical surpluses, they are entirely appropriated by the 
country. However, because of the imperfect surplus discrimination17, this advantage 
decreases with the dispersion of the surpluses. On the contrary. given that the posted- 
tax mechanism always sets the same tax on both NIN Cs. its relative advantage is that, 
when the two MNCs produce identical profits, their entire surpluses are appropriated 
by the country. Though, this advantage decreases with the dispersion of the profits. We 
can summarise these two results by saying that the relative advantage of the bargaining 
mechanism over the posted-tax one is higher the lower (higher) is the dispersion of the 
surpluses (profits) between the two MNCs. 
Let us move on now to give a more formal explanation of these relative advantages. 
It is obvious from the first part of corollary 13 that in order to look for these relative 
advantages we have to concentrate in the cases where to attract both MNCs is the 
optimal policy for at least one of the mechanisms. Thus, we have to examine three 
different situations. The case where to attract both MNCs is the optimal policy under 
both mechanisms. The two cases where it is optimal to attract both MNCs in the 
bargaining mechanism but only the MNC of type a or b in the posted-tax one. Finally, 
the case where it is optimal to attract both MNCs in the posted-tax mechanism but 
only the MNC of type a in the bargaining one. 
Let us begin analysing the case where to attract both MNCs is the optimal policy 
under both mechanisms. Thus, knowing that Sb = erb + eb and Sa = 7a + ea and 
that the optimal central government policy attracting both MNCs under the bargaining 
mechanism is g= Sb, expression 3.8 is equivalent to: 
ewä b= 
((irb 
+ eb) + 
ýa + ea - `7rb + eb) P+ (irb + eb) (1 - p) (3.22) 2 
The expressions 3.18 and 3.22 have the same interpretation. That is, the first and 
second terms are the expected total taxes (i. e. expected sum of the central government 
and regional taxes) charged on the MNCs of type a and b respectively. Indeed, it is clear 
from looking at the second term of both expressions that the total tax on the MNC of 
type b in the posted-tax mechanism is lower or equal than in the bargaining one (i. e. 
min (era, lrb) + eb < 7rb + eb). However, to get a more precise understanding of the effects 
17 See footnote 2. 
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that different parameters have on the relative advantage of the bargaining mechanism 
over the posted-tax one, let us subtract 3.18 from 3.22: 
ewb - ew7ý - 
(7a -ea+7rb+eb 
_ min 
(7ta, 7b)) P 
a, b a, b -l2 (3.23) 
+ (7rb - min (ira, ltb)) (1 - p) 
The first and second terms of the previous expression are the bargaining mechanism 
relative advantages from attracting the MNCs of type a and b respectively. Then. in the 
case that Ira > 7rb the only difference between the two mechanisms comes from the total 
tax paid by the MNC of type a. For by replacing min (iia, erb) = 7rb into expression 3.23 
we get that: 
bp 7ta-7b eb - ea ewa b- ewa b=2+ 2) 
(3.24) 
On the contrary, if lra < 7rb the bargaining mechanism would generate relatively more 
country's welfare than the posted-tax mechanism from the MNC of type b, but less from 
the MNC of type a. For by replacing min (Ira, 7rb) = 71a into expression 3.23 we get 
that: 
bp eb - ea p 
ewab - ewab= 2p +(7fb-71a) 
1- 2 (3.25) 
From expressions 3.24 and 3.25 we get that the likelihood that the posted-tax mechanism 
dominates the bargaining one is higher the lower are eb and the dispersion of the profits 
(17ra - 7rb I) and the higher is ea i8 . 
However, the effect from p is indeterminate because 
it is positive in expression 3.24 but negative in expression 3.25. 
Thus, let us move on and explain the intuition of the previous results. We have that, 
on the one hand, the lower is the dispersion of the profits the lower is the posted-tax 
mechanism disadvantage produced by the inability of applying tax discrimination. 
On the other hand, the effect coming from eb and ea can be explained by the fact that 
the relative advantage of the bargaining mechanism over the posted-tax one is higher the 
lower is the dispersion of the surpluses between the two MNCs. However, we know that 
a lower profits dispersion also increases the tax posting mechanism relative advantage 
1'5 The effect from 1 irQ - 7rb I is produced by the fact that the likelihood that the posted-tax mechanism 
dominates the bargaining one is higher the lower is ira - lrb (the lower is 7rb - 7ro, ) in expression 3.24 
(expression 3.25) where 7tQ > lrb (where Ira, < erb). 
43 
over the bargaining one. Then, the only way of reducing the surpluses dispersion and 
consequently increasing the relative advantage of the bargaining mechanism is by a rise 
in eb and/or a fall in ea,. For, given sa, > Sb, this would reduce the surpluses dispersion. 
We can also see this result in expressions 3.18 and 3.22. Thus, under both the 
bargaining and tax posting mechanisms the externality produced by the low surplus 
MNC (i. e., type b) has the same positive effect on the country's welfare when this MN C 
shows up. However, when the high surplus MNC (i. e., type a) shows up the externality 
produced by the low surplus MNC has no effect under the tax posting mechanism, but 
it allows a higher "reservation tax" under the bargaining one. Furthermore, the exter- 
nality produced by the high surplus MNC has a lower positive effect on the country's 
welfare under the bargaining mechanism than under the tax posting one. For, under the 
bargaining mechanism this externality increases the size of the cake19 which is subject to 
negotiation between the region and the MNC. On the contrary, this cake is completely 
appropriated by the country under the tax posting mechanism. 
We can summarise the previous results by mentioning the respective advantageous 
features of the bargaining and posted-tax mechanisms. The advantageous feature of the 
bargaining mechanism is the fact that, when the two MNCs produce identical surpluses, 
they are entirely appropriated by the country. However, because of the imperfect surplus 
discrimination, this advantage decreases with the dispersion of the surpluses. On the 
contrary, given that the posted-tax mechanism always sets the same tax on both MNCs, 
its advantageous feature is that, when the two MNCs produce identical profits, their 
entire surpluses are appropriated by the country. Though, this advantage decreases 
with the dispersion of the profits. 
By now we have analysed the relative advantages and disadvantages of the bar- 
gaining mechanism assuming that to attract both MNCs is the optimal policy in both 
mechanisms. However, does this explanation still apply when it is optimal to only at- 
tract one MNC in one or the other mechanism? As we already said, to give an answer 
to this question it is necessary to analyse the following three cases. The first two cases 
are when it is optimal to attract both MNCs in the bargaining mechanism but only 
the MNC of type a or b in the posted-tax one. The third case is when it is optimal to 
attract both 'MINCs in the posted-tax mechanism but only the MNC of type a in the 
19The after reservation tax surplus. 
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bargaining one. 
Consider first the case where it is optimal to attract both SIN Cs in the bargaining 
mechanism but only the MN C of type b in the posted-tax one. It should be obvious 
that the bargaining mechanism advantage in terms of surplus discrimination would still 
be present in this case. Indeed, the advantage of attracting two SIN Cs instead of one 
would be added. 
Now, knowing that to only attract the MNC of type a produces the same country's 
welfare in both mechanisms, let us move on to analyse the case where to only attract 
this MNC is the optimal policy in the posted-tax mechanism, but the attraction of 
both MNCs is the optimal one in the bargaining one. It is obvious that if this were 
the case, the advantage provided by the bargaining mechanism, when attracting both 
MNCs, would be relatively higher than the one provided by the posted-tax one. Exactly 
the contrary explanation applies to the case where to only attract the MNC of type a 
is the optimal policy in the bargaining mechanism, but the attraction of both MNCs 
is the optimal policy in the posted-tax one. That is, the advantages provided by the 
posted-tax mechanism are relatively more significant than the advantages provided by 
the bargaining one. 
In order to have a more graphical understanding of a situation where the posted 
tax mechanism strictly dominates the bargaining one let's take a look at the following 
numerical example. 
Example 14 Assume the MNCs of type a and b produce externalities of ea, = 80 and 
eb = 20 respectively and profits of Ira = 7rb = 30 (i. e. sa, = 110 and Sb = 50), and 
p=0.5. Figure 3-2 shows the expected country's welfare produced by the two alternative 
policies under the bargaining mechanism and the three alternative ones under the posted 
tax one. It is clear that the highest expected country's welfare is achieved when both 
MNCs are attracted under the posted tax mechanism, what implies that this mechanism 
dominates the bargaining one. Indeed, as suggested before, 17ra - 7rb is low and there is 
a high correlation between the externalities and the surpluses produced by the MNCs. 
Finally, it is important. to take a look at a special case (Wang's case) for which the 
bargaining mechanism weakly dominates the posted tax one. This special case is the 
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Figure 3-2: Numerical example: the posted tax mechanism dominates the bargaining 
one 
b produce respective profits of 40 and 30. It should be obvious that in this particular 
example there is no policy that attracts only an MNC of type b. For every tax that is 
accepted by an MNC of type b would be also accepted by an MNC of type a. Thus, 
independently of the mechanism, the only possibilities are to only attract an MNC of 
type a or to attract both MNCs. Then, on the one hand, we already know that if the 
policy only attracting the MNC of type a is the optimal one under both mechanisms, 
there would be no difference in the expected country's welfare they produce. On the 
other hand, the optimal central government policy in order to attract both MNCs is to 
set g= Sb = 30 and g= min (7ra,, 71b) = erb = Sb = 30 under the bargaining and posted 
tax mechanisms respectively. However, from expressions 3.8 and 3.18 we have that the 
expected country's welfare are ewä b= 35p + 30 (1- p) and ewä b= 30 respectively, what 
implies that the bargaining mechanism dominates the posted tax one. 
3.7 Conclusion 
We have developed a framework where, in a heterogeneous buyers setting, two selling 
mechanisms have been compared, bargaining with reservation price versus posted price 
selling, in terms of the revenues generated for a monopolistic seller. 
This comparison has been done in a setting where a country and an MNC negotiate 
the tax to be paid for the installation of a new production plant. In order to simplify the 
analysis we have ruled out any competition coming from another country and assumed 
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the existence of only one region. One innovative feature in our setting of the problem 
is that the seller (the country) gets a non-monetary gain (an externality) in addition to 
the selling price (the tax). Indeed, our model is general enough as to also incorporate 
the case where the one choosing between the two selling mechanism (in our case the 
country) is the buyer. 
We have considered the stylized fact that the central government has to set the taxes 
in advance (tax posting), but depending on the negotiation mechanism, the regional 
government can either bargain or post a tax. Furthermore, the MNC has to accept 
whichever negotiation mechanism is in place and decide whether to establish its new 
production plant in the country. 
Interesting results have been found. In particular, when the seller also gets a non- 
monetary gain in addition to the selling price, it is not always the case that bargaining 
dominates posted price selling. However, we also saw that from the seller's perspective 
the bargaining mechanism is superior to the posted tax one for a very plausible range 
of parameter values which, as in Wang (1995), includes the case where the MNCs only 
produce profits and no externalities to the region. 
We have shown that the bargaining mechanism optimality decreases with the dis- 
persion of the surpluses and that the posted-tax one does it with the dispersion of the 
profits. Indeed, we have proved that, even though the dispersion in the profits has a 
positive correlation with the dispersion in the surpluses, a lower dispersion in profits 
has a higher positive effect on the country's welfare under the posted-tax mechanism 
than under the bargaining one. This led us to conclude that the likelihood that the bar- 
gaining mechanism dominates the posted-tax one is higher the higher is the dispersion 
of the profits and the lower is the externality of the high surplus MNC with respect to 
the one produced by the low surplus one. 
As a consequence of the previous explanation we also find that the composition of the 
surplus between profits and externalities does not produce any effect on the equilibrium 
expected country's welfare in the bargaining mechanism. However, it does in the posted 
tax one. Indeed, this is the main reason leading to the result that to only attract the 
low surplus MNC can be the optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism and not 
under the bargaining one. 
Two important policy recommendations are derived. On the one hand, our model 
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UNIEV 
determines the optimal central government tax policy under each of the negotiation 
mechanisms. On the other hand, it establishes the optimal negotiation mechanism 
under specific ranges of parameter values, what becomes important in the case the 
central government of the country has some control of it. 
Our model can also be applied to other frameworks where the main issue is the 
choice between bargaining with reservation price or posted price selling. An example 
could be the subsidies offered by cities or regions in order to attract specific airlines to 
their local airports. This type of subsidy is very common all around the world, though 
not allowed in the European Union. 
Finally, we recognise that an important limitation of our model is the fact that it 
can only be applied to a country with only one region (agent). That is, there was no 
consideration of the effects from the competition coming from a second region. Indeed, 
the results of the model depend on the existence of only two types of MNCs. I could 
be interesting to explore how the results are affected by the consideration of a more 




The region can choose between 
the bargaining and posted tax 
mechanisms 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have analysed the negotiation process between an MNC and 
the host country assuming that the only region of the country can only use bargaining 
or tax posting. No consideration has been made of a case where the region can choose 
between these two mechanisms. We will refer to the mechanism where the region can 
choose between using bargaining and tax posting as the "mix-negotiation mechanism". 
The analysis of this last mechanism is the main aim of the present chapter. 
However, let us explain the decision of writing the mixed negotiation mechanism 
in a separate chapter. The reason is not because it is completely different from the 
two mechanisms analysed in the previous chapter. As it will be clear soon there is 
substantial overlapping between the two chapters. However, the comparison of the two 
regimes of the previous chapter comes to fill a gap in the literature on the optimal 
selection mechanisms. Then, we have considered prudent to address this gap in that 
chapter and leave the analysis of the mixed negotiation mechanism for the present one. 
Some interesting results are found. The most important one is that, for those para- 
meter values where the bargaining mechanism is welfare superior to the posted tax one, 
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we also find that the addition of the posting tax strategy to the regional options not only 
cannot increase the expected country's welfare, but it reduces it in some cases. It seems 
striking that the addition of another negotiation tool to the region reduces the expected 
country's welfare. The intuition of this result is that the existence of a regional choice 
between bargaining and posted tax creates a conflict of interests between the region 
and the central government. That is, it is optimal for the country that the bargaining 
strategy is used in order to attract both MNCs but not for the region. Interestingly, this 
conflict of interests does not exist when the region cannot choose between strategies. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 
3 compares the mixed and the bargaining mechanisms. Section 4 compares the mixed 
and the posted tax mechanisms. The main results are summarised in section 5. Section 
6 concludes. 
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4.2 The model 
We assume a three-stage game involving the central government, one region, and a 
MNC, which can be of type a or b. In the first stage, in order to maximise the expected 
country's welfare the central government posts a lump sum tax to be paid by the SIN Cs. 
In the second stage the regional government chooses its optimal taxing strategy. That 
is, whether or not to post a particular tax to be paid by the MNC in the third stage. 
Finally, in the third stage an MNC shows up and negotiates the tax with the region. 
Let us begin analysing the third stage of the game. On the one hand if the region 
has chosen bargaining in the second stage, it would have to bargain with the MNC in 
the third stage. On the other hand, if the region has chosen to post a tax in the second 
stage and in the case the MNC decides to build the plant in the region, the MNC would 
have to accept the posted tax. In this last case, we already know from the previous 
chapter that the region has the three following strategies: To only attract an MNC of 
type a, to only attract an MNC of type b, or to attract both types of MNCs. As in the 
previous chapter we will first find the optimal regional tax under each possible regional 
strategy. Then, the optimal regional strategy will be the one providing the highest 
payoff. 
It must be noticed that we cannot use here the expressions 3.17,3.18, and 3.19 
obtained in the previous chapter to calculate the expected regional payoff under each 
strategy because, for simplicity, these expressions were obtained under the assumption 
that g=0. Thus, in order to obtain the expected regional payoffs under each of these 
strategies in the mixed negotiation mechanism we replace t from expression 3.13 into 
expression 3.12. Then, we get that 
ezä'm = (Sa - 9)p if Ira > 7rb 
(4.1) 
if a tax that only attracts an MNC of type a is posted', 
ezb'm = (Sb - 9) (1 - p) if 7rb > 7a (4.2) 
IIt is obvious that the MNC of type a would be attracted if Sa >_ g. However, for the sake of 
simplicity the second line of expression 3.12 is eliminated from expressions 4.1,4.2, and 4.3. Similar 
procedure will be used in the following expressions for the regional payoff as well as for the country's 
welfare. 
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if a tax that only attracts an INT\ C of type b is posted, 
eza, b = min (Ira, 7rb) + eap + eb (1 - p) -9 (4.3) 
if a tax that attracts both MNCs is posted. 
In the case that the region uses a bargaining mechanism and depending on the 
central government tax, it is able to attract both types of ENCs or only an NI NC of 
type a. Then, the expected regional payoffs, which are derived from expression 3.3 are: 
b, m= - 
(sa)p 
(4.4) 
if only the MNC of type a is attracted when bargaining is chosen (if Sa >g but sb < g), 
and 
eza b= 
sa 9P + Sb 9 (1 - P) (4.5) 22 
if the two MNCs are attracted when bargaining is chosen (if sa, Sb > g). 
Let us now move on to the second stage of the game and use h to refer to the five 
possible strategies for the region. That is, the three posting tax strategies plus the two 
bargaining ones respectively attracting one or both MNCs. Moreover, let us refer to 
h* as the optimal regional strategy. That is, the strategy that provides the maximum 






ezä'b , ezä''n, ezä'b ,0 
Recall that the upper script m stands for 'mix-mechanism' and the upper scripts p 
and b indicate whether a tax posting or bargaining strategy is selected. 
Let us analyse the first stage of the game. In this stage the central government 
maximises the expected country's welfare. The best way to find the unconditional 
maximum expected country's welfare is to first obtain the conditional ones. That is, 
the maximum expected country's welfare conditional on each particular strategy being 
the optimal one for the region. Then, the maximum of these conditional maximum 
expected country's welfares is the unconditional one. Finally, the central government 
tax necessary to achieve this unconditional maximum expected country's welfare is the 
optimal central government tax. 
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Let us move on then to find these conditional maximum expected country's welfares. 
We know from 3.11 that the ex-post regional payoff is zi = t2 + ei . and 
from expression 
3.15 that the ex-post country's welfare is w=g+ ti + ei. This means that in order to 
pass from the ex-post regional payoff to the ex-post country's welfare we only need to 
add g to expressions 4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4, and 4.5. This is done in expressions 4.6,4.71,4.8. 
4.9, and 4.10, in order to obtain the conditional maximum expected country's welfares. 
ewh* 
(c) 
= ewä'm(c) = sap if ezh = eza, b (4.6) 
= ewb'm c) = sb (1 - p) if ez = ezb'm 
(4.7) 
= ewä; b = min (Ira) erb) + eap + eb(1 - p) if ez, = ezä; b (4.8) 
= ewb, m(c) = g+ 
sa 9p if ezh = ezb, m (4.9) 2 
= ewä, b 
(c) 
= 
sa 2gp+ (Sb 29 (1 - p) if ez1''* = ezä, b (4.10) 
where the upper script (c) indicates that these expected country's welfares are condi- 
tional on the particular strategy being the optimal one for the region. For instance, in 
(4.6) this condition is stated in the expression "iff ezh* = ezä'b ". The upper script h* 
indicates the particular regional strategy being implemented. 
Then, the unconditional maximum expected country's welfare is: 




ewä'm(c), ewa, b 
(c) 
f (4.11) 
Finally, the optimal central government tax, g*, is the particular tax solving the follow- 
ing expression 
g* =arg max ewih* 
9 
(4.12) 
Let us make a clarification. That is, the fact that the expected country's welfare in 
expressions 4.6,4.7, and 4.8 (under the three posted tax strategies) are conditional (on 
the particular strategy also being the optimal one for the region) is not a problem. For 
by setting g=0 the expected regional payoff is equal to the expected country's welfare 
for each of these strategies and so the implementation of the country's optimal one is 
guaranteed. Moreover, for simplicity, we can ignore the alternative of only attracting 
an NINC of type a by the use of a bargaining strategy (expression 4.9). For, at most, 
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it provides the same expected country's welfare than the posting tax strategy that only 
attracts this type of v1NC (expression 4.6). 
Let us move on now to show some identities in order to simplify the notation to 
be used in the following two sections of the chapter. They are identities between the 
expected country's welfare produced by particular strategies under the three different 
negotiation mechanisms. That is, the mixed negotiation mechanism of this chapter and 
the bargaining and posted price mechanisms of the previous one. This is done in the 
following three propositions 
Proposition 15 If optimally designed, a strategy only attracting an MNC of type a 
produces the same country's welfare, whether the mechanism is of the bargaining, posted 
tax, or mixed type (i. e. ewä(c) -e Jap(c) -= ewp, 
m(c) 
_ ewa, m(c) ). 
Proof. This is obvious from the comparison of expressions 3.7,3.17,4.6, and 4.9. 
In the case of expression 4.9 the optimal central government tax is g= sa,.   
Proposition 16 A strategy only attracting an MNC of type b produces the same coun- 
try's welfare in the posted tax and mixed negotiation mechanisms (i. e. ewb(c) ewf'm(c)) 
Proof. This is obvious from the comparison of expressions 4.7 and 3.19.   
The previous two propositions allows us to make the following definitions 
Definition 17 ewb - ewä(C) - ewä'm(c) =- ewa, 
m(c) 
= ew(e) 
Definition 18 ewb(c) ewb, "', 
(c) 
ewbc) 
As a consequence of the previous two definitions, from now on and independently of 
the mechanism being considered, we will just refer to the "strategy that only attracts an 
MNC of type a" and the "strategy that only attracts an MNC of type V. Indeed, we will 
just use ew(c) and ewbc) to refer to the expected country's welfare under these strategies. 
Furthermore, we leave the term "bargaining strategy" to refer to the bargaining strategy 
attracting both MNCs. 
Proposition 19 A strategy attracting both MNCs produces the same expected country's 
welfare 1)i the posted tax and inired negotiation mechanisms (i. e. eýcva, bý ewa, 
b ýýý) 
Proof. This is obvious from the comparison of expressions 4.8 and 3.18.   
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4.3 Comparison between the bargaining and mixed nego- 
tiation mechanisms 
In this subsection we are interested in comparing the expected country's welfare in the 
bargaining and mixed negotiation mechanisms. The first result is stated in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 20 For the range of values where the posted tax mechanism strictly (weakly) 
dominates the bargaining one, the equilibrium expected country's welfare is the same in 
the mixed and posted tax mechanisms and so the mixed negotiation mechanism strictly 
(weakly) dominates the bargaining one. 
Proof. This is the case because, as we already said, by setting g=0 the central 
government guarantees the implementation of the optimal posting tax strategy.   
For those parameter values where the posted tax mechanism strictly dominates the 
bargaining one this proposition has the following two implications. First, the addition 
of a bargaining tool to a region that already has a posted tax one would not alter the 
expected country's welfare. Second, the addition of a posted tax negotiation tool to a 
region that already has a bargaining one would increase the expected country's welfare. 
However, what happens to the expected country's welfare when the addition of the 
posted tax negotiation tool to the region is made for those parameter values where 
the bargaining mechanism strictly dominates the posted tax one? In the rest of this 
section we will look for an answer to this question, what requires a comparison between 
the mixed and bargaining mechanisms. At first glance it seems that the addition of 
the posted tax negotiation tool to the region should not produce any reduction in the 
expected country's welfare. But, we will see that it does. 
Let us see why it is that. Note that for the rest of the section we will assume that 
the parameter values are such that the bargaining mechanism strictly dominates the 
posted tax one. We already know that if the attraction of only the MNC of type a 
is the optimal policy under the bargaining mechanism, the mixed and the bargaining 
mechanisms would produce the same equilibrium expected country's welfare. Surpris- 
ingly, if the optimal policy under the bargaining mechanism is to attract both SIN Cs. 
the equilibrium expected country's welfare would be higher than under the mixed one. 
The reason for this last result becomes apparent in the following numerical example. 
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Example 21 Assume the MNCs of type a and b produce respectizle profits of 40 and 30. 
zero externalities, and the probability of an MNC of type b showing up is high enough 
as to make it optimal for the country to attract both MNCs under the bargaining mech- 
anism (say 1-p=0.8). That is, the expected country's welfare in expression 3.8 is 
higher than the one in expression 3.7. Thus, it is optimal for the central government to 
charge a tax g=: erb = 30 and the expected country's welfare is given by expression 3.8 
(i. e. ew = 35p + 30 (1 - p) = 31). 
On the contrary, if the central government sets this same tax g= 30 under the mixed 
negotiation mechanism, the region would have an incentive to post a tax that only at- 
tracts the MNC of type a. That is, it would be optimal for the region to post a tax equal 
to 10. The region gets the entire after-tax surplus produced by an MNC of type a, but 
the MNC of type b does not come to the country2. Then, the expected country's welfare 
is the same as the one achieved by the tax policy that only attracts the MNC of type a 
(expression 4.6). 
This result is a direct consequence of the fact that, as we already said, it is not 
enough for the bargaining strategy to be optimal for the country, but it has to be also 
optimal for the region. That is, the expected country's welfare in expression 4.10 is 
conditional on the fact that the bargaining strategy is also the optimal one for the 
region. 
The previous numerical example made it clear that the bargaining strategy cannot be 
the optimal one under the mixed negotiation mechanism if g= 7rb. Then, the question 
is: could the bargaining strategy be the optimal one if g< lrb. We will see later on that 
under very special circumstances this is the case. However, even if this were the case 
we know from the comparison of expressions 3.8 and 4.10 that ewä b> ewa, 
b (c) 
. That 
is, the expected country's welfare produced by the bargaining strategy attracting both 
MNCs is higher under the bargaining mechanism than under the mixed one. 
Then, given that ewä'm(c) = ewä = ewä = ewa, we can make the following definition: 
Definition 22 The bargaining mechanism strictly (weakly) dominates the mixed one if 
and only if ewä b> ewh* 
(ewb 
b> ewh*). 
2 This strategy gives the region a payoff equal to 10p, which is higher than the one obtained when it 
chooses bargaining. equal to (10/2)p. 
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Thus, the following proposition applies: 
Proposition 23 For those parameter values where the bargaining mechanism strictly 
dominates the posted tax one, it also strictly dominates the mixed negotiation mecha- 
nism. 
Proof. From proposition 10 we have that the bargaining mechanism strictly dom- 
inates the posted tax one if ewä b> max 
(ewe,, 
ewQ b) and from proposition 9 we 
have ewä b> ewb. Then, given that ewä b> ewä; 
b (C), it must be also the case that 
ewä b> ewh* .  
In the previous chapter we have found that the bargaining mechanism was welfare 
superior to the posted tax one for a very plausible range of parameter values. For this 
same range of values, we find now that the addition of the posting tax tool to a region 
that was already able to use the bargaining one cannot increase the expected country's 
welfare. Indeed, it reduces it under some parameter values. It seems striking that 
the addition of another negotiation tool to the region reduces the expected country's 
welfare. What produces this result is that, in some circumstances, the existence of a 
regional choice between bargaining and posted tax creates a conflict of interests between 
the region and the country. That is, it is optimal for the country that the bargaining 
strategy is used in order to attract both MNCs but not for the region. It is obvious 
that this conflict of interests does not exist when the region can only use the bargaining 
mechanism or it can only use the posted tax one. 
Finally, it could be that the reason why the regional government has only the bar- 
gaining negotiation mechanism is because the central government does not allow it to 
post a tax. If this were the case, the previous result would imply that, for those para- 
meter values where the bargaining mechanism dominates the mixed one, it is optimal 
for the central government not to allow the regional posted tax and leave the region 
with only the bargaining negotiation mechanism. 
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4.4 Comparison between the posted tax and mixed nego- 
tiation mechanisms 
In the present section we want to make a comparison between the posted tax and mixed 
negotiation mechanisms in order to find which one produces a higher expected country's 
welfare. We know that by setting g=0 in the mixed negotiation mechanism the central 
government can get the same equilibrium expected country's welfare than under the 
posted tax one. As stated in proposition 20, this results in the mixed negotiation 
mechanism producing the same expected country's welfare than the posted tax one. 
Then, it is obvious that the only case where the mixed negotiation mechanism has some 
chances of dominating the posted tax one is when the bargaining strategy attracting 
both MNCs is the equilibrium one3. Indeed, under some parameter values this will be 
the case. However, as we will see later on, this happens under very special circumstances. 
Let us take a closer look to this particular case where the mixed negotiation mech- 
anism dominates the posted tax one. In order to find this case we follow three steps. 
First, under the mixed negotiation mechanism, we find the particular parameter val- 
ues and central government taxes for which the bargaining strategy is the optimal one 
for the region. In fact we will soon see that there is only one central government tax 
satisfying this. Second, we check if this particular tax policy is also the optimal one 
for the central government and so the equilibrium one in the mixed negotiation mecha- 
nism. Finally, we check if this optimal policy under the mixed negotiation mechanism 
dominates the one under the tax posting one. If this were the case we would conclude 
that the mixed negotiation mechanism dominates the posted tax one. 
Let us work out the first step and find the particular parameter values and central 
government tax under which the bargaining strategy is the optimal one for the region. 
On the one hand, it is necessary that the bargaining strategy provides the region a higher 
payoff than both the posted tax only attracting an MNC of type a (i. e. ezä, b > ezä'm) 
and a posted tax only attracting an MNC of type b (i. e. ezä; b > ezb'm'). On the other 
hand, it requires that the bargaining strategy provides the region a higher payoff than 
3 That is, it is the optimal one for both the region and the central government. In fact, if the 
bargaining strategy attracting both MINCs is the optimal one in the mix regime we can be sure that 
the bargaining regime dominates the pre-commitment one. However, we will soon see that the reverse 
is not always true. 
58 
a posted tax one attracting both -\I\ Cs (i. e. ezä, b > eza, b 
m). 
Let us analyse the first of these requisites. Given expressions 4.5.4.1. and 4.2. 
ezä' > eza and ezä; b > ezb'm imply that the following two weak inequalities have to 
be satisfied: 
Sb 9(1 




sat 9p sb2 9(l 
-p) 
It is obvious that given p>0, g< sb is necessary in order for inequality 4.13 to be 
satisfied. The only way for these two weak inequalities to be satisfied is that they apply 
with an equal sign. This implies 
(sb - 9) (1 - p) _ (sa - 9)p 
This means that in order for the region to be willing to implement the bargaining 
strategy it is necessary that the previous mentioned three strategies provide the same 





to be the optimal one for the region, the central government tax must be equal to: 
9 
Sb (I - p) - SaP (4.16) 
(1 - 2p) 
It is obvious that for this value of g the region is indifferent between the three 
strategies, bargaining (i. e., b(a, b)) or the two posting price strategies attracting only 
one type of MNC (i. e., p(a), and p(b)). Then, it seems reasonable to think that it 
would choose each of them with equal probability (i. e. 1/3%). Let us refer to this 
strategy as the "compound strategy". Obviously, the expected regional payoff under 
b, m this conditional strategy is ez"'"Z = eza'"t = ezb'm = eza, b 
Let us now analyse the second mentioned requisite. That is, the fact that the 
bargaining strategy provides the region a higher payoff than a posted tax one attracting 
both MNCs (i. e. eza; b > ezä; b 
). This issue is dealt with in propositions 24,25, and 26. 
Proposition 24 shows that this would not be the case if to attract both MINCs is the 
optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism. For, in this case, the mixed negotiation 
mechanism would provide the same expected country's welfare than the posted tax one. 
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On the contrary. propositions 25 and 26 show that this is the case if to only attract 
an MNC of type a or b is the optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism and the 
bargaining mechanism dominates the posted tax one. 
Proposition 24 If the optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism is to attract both 
MNCs (i. e. ewä b> max 
(eä,, ewbP)) the bargaining strategy would not be implemented 
by the region in a mixed negotiation mechanism. 
Proof. If the parameter values were such that under the posted tax mechanism it 
is optimal to attract both MNCs (i. e. ewa, b > max 
(ewä, ewb)) 1 the optimal central 
government tax would be such that ezä b> max 
(ezä, ezb) applies`. Then, from expres- 
sions 3.18,3.17,3.19,4.1, and 4.2, we get that eza' > min (eza'm, ezb'm). However, 
from expression 4.15 we know that for bargaining not to be a dominated strategy under 
the mixed negotiation mechanism it must be that ezb'b = ezä'm = ezb'm. Thus we can 
conclude that ezä; b > ezä b and so the bargaining strategy would not be implemented 
by the region.   
Even though it is not central to the point we are looking for, the previous proposition 
has the obvious implication that, if the parameter values are such that the optimal 
policy under the posted tax mechanism is to attract both MNCs, but the bargaining 
mechanism dominates the posted tax one, the expected country's welfare is the same 
under both the posted tax and the mixed negotiation mechanisms. 
Proposition 25 If the optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism is to only attract 
the MNC of type a (i. e. ewä > max (ewä b) ewb 
)) and the bargaining mechanism domi- 
nates the posted tax one, it is also the case that ezä'b > ezä' . 
That is, the bargaining 
strategy provides the region a higher payoff than a posted tax one attracting both MNCs. 
Proof. We know that ewä > ewä b implies ezä'm > ezä; 
b 
, what given ezä'm = eza; 
b 
also implies eza'b > eza'b .  
Proposition 26 When under the posted tax mechanism the optimal policy is to only 
attract the AINC of type b (i. e. ewb > max (ewä b, ewe)) and the bargaining mechanism 
' If, for example, the central government tax were g= Sb it would not be the case that ezQ b> 
max (cz , ezb). 
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dominates the posted tax one, it is also the case that eza, b > eza, b That is. the 
bargaining strategy provides the region a higher payoff than a posted tax one that attracts 
both MNCs. 
b, m Proof. We know that ewb > ewä b implies ezb'M > ezä; 
b 
, what given ezb 
m= eza, b 
also implies ezä; b > eza b. 0 
Thus, from proposition 24 we can conclude that, if the optimal policy under the 
posted tax mechanism is to attract both MNCs, the bargaining strategy could not be the 
optimal one for the region in the mixed negotiation mechanism. On the contrary, from 
propositions 25 and 26 we get that, if the optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism 
is to only attract an MNC of type a or b and the bargain mechanism dominates the 
posted tax one, the bargaining strategy provides the region a higher payoff than the 
posted tax one attracting both MNCs. In this last case, the only restrictions for the 
bargaining strategy to be an optimal one for the region are the ones in expression 4.13 
and 4.14. As we already saw they are equivalent to g being given by expression 4.16 
and in this case the region is indifferent between the three strategies b(a, b), p(a), and 
p(b). We have also said that if the central government sets this tax, the region will 
choose each of these strategies with equal probability (i. e. 1/3%) and so the bargaining 
strategy attracting both MNCs would be implemented with positive probability. 
4.4.1 When under the posted tax mechanism the optimal policy is to 
only attract the MNC of type a. 
We have already determined that under some parameter values the bargaining strategy 
attracting both MNCs has some probability of being implemented by the region. We 
have also shown that this would be the case for those parameter values where the 
optimal policy under the posted tax mechanism is to only attract an MNC of type a 
or b. Indeed, we know that the central government tax has to be the one in expression 
4.16, what makes the region choose between the strategies b(a, b), p(a), and p(b) with 
equal probability. Then, using 4.6,4.7 and 4.10 we get that the expected country's 
welfare is given by the following expression: 







(1 - p) + saP + sb(1 - p) /3 (4.17 
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Then, in order to know if the tax given by expression 4.16 is also an equilibrium 
for the central government, it has to be the case that the expected country's welfare in 
the previous expression is higher than the one produced by each of the other available 
strategies (i. e. p(a), p(b), and p(a, b)). In the present section we check if this is the case 
when under the posted tax mechanism the optimal policy is to only attract the MN C 
of type a, and in the next one we check if this is the case when under the posted tax 
mechanism the optimal policy is to only attract the MNC of type b. 
Thus, if under the posted tax mechanism the optimal policy were to only attract 





= ewä, Tn(c) = SQp. 
(4.18) 
J 
That is, it must also be the optimal posted tax strategy under the mixed mechanisms. 
Thus, for the "compound strategy" to be the optimal one for the central government 
and so the bargaining strategy to have 1/3% probability of being played it has to be 







(1 - pA + SaP + Sb(1 - P) /3 > sap (4.19) 
It is obvious that, given that all the posting tax strategies are available under the 
mixed negotiation mechanism, if the "compound strategy" were the equilibrium one (in- 
equality 4.19 is satisfied) the mixed negotiation mechanism would dominate the posted 
tax one. 
Let us find now the parameter values for which the inequality 4.19 is satisfied. By 
replacing 4.16 into 4.19 and simplifying we get: 
sb(1-p)-SaP 
(1-2p) + 
38b(1 - p) > asap (4.2 0) 
From expressions 4.7 and 4.18 we know that 8b (1 - p) < sap, what implies that 
38b(1 - p) < 3sa, p. Then, for inequality 4.20 to be satisfied it has to be the case 
that Sb 
11 p) sap > 06, what requires p>1 
"For, we know that by setting g=0 the country would be able to obtain the maximum welfare 
achievable under the posted tax mechanism. 
This also implies that the optimal central government tax is positive. 
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Furthermore, we know that for bargaining to be the central government optimal 
strategy under the mixed negotiation mechanism, it must be the case that expression 
4.10 is higher than 4.6, what implies: 
2 p+ 2(1-p)+"2>sap 
(4.21) 
Then, from expressions 4.16 and 4.21 we get: 
Sb(pp-2P+1) > Sa(-PP+P) (4.22) 
On the one hand, the roots of pp - 2p +1=0 are pl, p2 = 1,1, what implies that 
pp - 2p +1>0, except for p=1. On the other hand -pp +p>0 for every 0<p<1. 
Then, given sa > sb, it must also be the case that: 
(pp-2p+1) > (-pp + p) 
what is equivalent to 
(4.23) 
2pp - 3p +1 >0 (4.24) 
The roots of 2pp - 3p +1=0 are pl, p2 = 
2, 1. This means that inequality 4.24 is 
only satisfied for 0<p<2. However, we know from before that 2<p<1. Then, we 
conclude that the bargaining strategy will not be implemented in the mixed negotiation 
mechanism if to only attract the MNC of type a is the optimal policy under the posted 
tax mechanism. 
4.4.2 When under the posted tax mechanism the optimal policy is to 
only attract the MNC of type b. 
Again, in order to know if the tax given by expression 4.16 is also an equilibrium for 
the central government, it has to be the case that the expected country's welfare in 
expression 4.17 is higher than the one produced by each of the other available strategies 
(i. e. p(a), p(b), and p(a, b)). In the present section we check if this is the case when 
under the posted tax mechanism the optimal policy is to only attract the '-\I- -\-C of type 
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= ewb'm(c) = Sb(1 - p). 
(4.25) 
J 
That is, it must also be the optimal posted tax strategy under the mixed mechanism7. 
Thus, for the "compound strategy" to be the optimal one for the central government 
and so the bargaining strategy to have 1/3% probability of being played it has to be 
the case that the expected country's welfare in expression 4.17 is higher than sb (1 - P): 
((g 
+ sa 29p+9+ 
sb 
29 
(1 - P) + sap + Sb (1 - P) /3 > Sb (1 -A (4.26) 
In fact, given that all the posting tax strategies are available under the mixed nego- 
tiation mechanism, it is obvious that if the "compound strategy" were the equilibrium 
one (inequality 4.26 is satisfied) the mixed negotiation mechanism would dominate the 
posted tax one. 
Let us find then the parameter values for which the inequality 4.26 is satisfied. By 
replacing 4.16 into 4.26 and simplifying we get: 
sb(1 - p) - SaP 
(1 - 2p) 
ý- 3sap > 3sb(1 - p) (4.27 
It is not possible to analytically prove that expression 4.27 is satisfied. Then, in order 
to prove that the compound strategy can be an equilibrium in the mixed negotiation 
mechanism we use the following numerical example. 
Example 27 Assume the MNCs of type a and b produce externalities of ea = 74 and 
eb =0 respectively and profits of lra = 22 and 7b = 95 respectively (i. e. sa = 96 and 
sb = 95), and p=0.42. 
Figure 4-1 shows the expected country's welfare and expected regional payoff produced 
by each of the strategies. It is clear that the equilibrium strategy under the posted tax 
mechanism is achieved when only the MNC of type b is attracted (ewb = ezb = 55.10). 
Howei'cr, under the mixed negotiation mechanism the compound strategy is the equi- 
librium one (eu, cs'' = ezcs, m = 1.52). which produces a expected countrys welfare of 
'The same reason given in footnote 6 applies here. 
64 
63.11. 
Thus, we can summarise section 4.4 results in the following two propositions: 
Proposition 28 The mixed negotiation mechanism weakly dominates the posted tax 
one. 
However, it is also the case that: 
Proposition 29 In order for the mixed negotiation mechanism to dominate the posted 
tax one it is necessary that: 1) the parameter values are such that the bargaining mech- 
anism dominates the posted tax one; 2) the MNC of type a produces more externality 
than profit (i. e. ea > ira); 3) the profit produced by an MNC of type b is more than 
twice the one produced by an MNC of type a (i. e. ib > 27ra); and 4) 3<p<2 
Proof. See appendix Al.   
The problem of the result in proposition 28 is that for the compound strategy to be 
the equilibrium one the central government has to set exactly the tax given in expression 
4.16. If it sets a marginally higher one, and given p< 28, inequality 4.14 would be 
satisfied, but not inequality 4.13. Then, it would be optimal for the region to post a 
subsidy that only attract an MNC of type a and the expected country's welfare would 
be given by expression 4.6 (equal to 40.32 in the previous numerical example). On the 
contrary, if it sets a marginally lower one, and given p<2, inequality 4.13 would be 
satisfied, but not inequality 4.14. Then, it would be optimal for the region to post a 
subsidy that only attract an MNC of type b and the expected country's welfare would 
be given by 4.7 (equal to 55.10 in the previous numerical example). 
In fact, as we already said, if the central government tax is marginally lower than 
the one in expression 4.16, the region would post a subsidy that only attract an MN C 
of type b. Then, as can be seen in 4-1, the expected country's welfare would be the 
same in the posted tax and mixed negotiation mechanisms. 
However, if the central government tax is marginally higher than the one in expres- 
sion 4.16, the region would post a subsidy that only attract an 'ZINC of type a. Then, 
This is the case because at the point where g is given by expression 4.16, the inequality 4.26 is 
satisfied what, given sb(1 - p) - sap, requires g= Sb(1i p) Sup > 0. 
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Bargaining mechanism 
Country's welfare Regional payoff 
ewä 40.32 ezä 0.00 
ewä b 95.21 ezb 0.50 
Posted tax mechanism 
Country's welfare Regional payoff 
ewä 40.32 ezä 40.32 
ewb 55.10 ezb 55.10 
ewä, b 53.08 ezä b 53.08 
Mixed mechanism 
Country's welfare Regional payoff 
ewä'n`(') 40.32 ezä'm 1.52 
ewb'm(') 55.10 ezb'm 1.52 
ewä, b 
(c) 53.08 ezä, b -39.29 
ewä, b (c) 93.90 ezä, b 1.52 
ewcs'm 63.11 ezcs, m 1.52 
Figure 4-1: The compound strategy 
we see in figure 4-1 that the expected country's welfare would be higher in the posted 
tax mechanism (i. e. ew = 55.10) than in the mixed one (i. e. ew = 40.32). 
Thus, a marginal miss-precision in the setting of the central government tax could 
result in a much lower expected country's welfare than the equilibrium one. Still, as it 
is clear in proposition 29, the mixed negotiation mechanism dominates the posted tax 
one only under a very narrow and unlikely range of values. 
An implication of proposition 28 appears in the case that the central government 
can determine the regional negotiation mechanism. The policy recommendation derived 
from this proposition is that the central government should use this power. A suggestion 
of how this could be possible will be left for the following section. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Summary of previous results 
Under this section we will give a short summary of the main results of the chapter. 
We have found that to only attract the low surplus NNC can be the optimal policy 
under the mixed negotiation mechanism as well. Considering the result in the previous 
chapter it would not be a surprise if this is the case for these parameter values where the 
posted tax mechanism dominates the bargaining one. For, under these parameter values, 
the posted tax and mixed negotiation mechanisms produce exactly the same results. 
However, the surprising thing is the fact that this is also the case for these parameter 
values where the bargaining mechanism dominates the posted tax one. Though, under 
these parameter values, we already saw that to only attract the MNC of type b is 
only "probabilistically optimal" under the mixed negotiation mechanism (i. e., when the 
compound strategy is the country's optimal one). 
Furthermore, we saw that under the same range of parameter values where the 
bargaining mechanism dominates the posted tax one, it also dominates the mixed ne- 
gotiation mechanism. This implies that, under these particular parameter values, the 
addition of the ability of posting a tax negotiation tool to a region which is already en- 
joying the ability of using bargaining reduces the expected country's welfare. It seems 
striking that the addition of another negotiation tool to the region can result in a lower 
expected country's welfare. As we have already explained the reason for that is the 
existence of a conflict of interests between the central government and the region. That 
is, under some circumstances, it is optimal for the country that the bargaining strategy 
is used in order to attract both MNCs but not for the region. We already saw that this 
conflict of interests does not exist in a mechanism where the region can only use one of 
the negotiation tools. 
We also saw that the mixed negotiation mechanism dominates the posted tax one. 
However, a marginal miss-precision in the setting of the central government tax could 
result in a much lower expected country's welfare than the equilibrium one. For. it 
would make the region to choose a strategy that is not optimal for the country. Still, 
as it is clear in proposition 29, the mixed negotiation mechanism dominates the posted 
tax one only under a very narrow and not very likely range of values. 
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4.5.2 Choosing the negotiation mechanism 
We have seen in this chapter that the expected country's welfare varies with the regional 
negotiation mechanism. Then, an interesting question is: Has the central government 
the power of changing the particular regional negotiation mechanism? It is possible to 
think of the central government having the ability to add and/or eliminate a specific 
regional negotiation tool (i. e. bargaining or posted tax capabilities). However, what can 
the central government do in order to achieve that? To answer this question we need to 
know the 'fundamentals' that make possible for a region to bargain and/or post a tax. 
A summary of these fundamentals are pointed out in the following two paragraphs. 
Fundamentals that make possible for a region to bargain. 1) The meetings 
between the MNC managers and the local authority have to be permitted. 2) It could 
be the case that in order for the bargaining to take place a special "bargaining board" 
is needed. 3) The regional government needs some degrees of freedom in determining 
the allocation of capital expenditure. As we already mentioned it is usually the case 
that the subsidies take the form of capital expenditure, which in one or another way 
has a positive impact in the MNC's profits. 
Fundamentals that make possible for a region to post a tax. One important 
requisite for a region to post a tax is the possibility of passing laws about MNCs. Among 
other things these laws could determine the taxes to be paid by the MNCs willing to 
build a new plant in the region. 
Then, if it were the case that a particular mechanism is better than another, it 
could be optimal for the central government to eliminate (make available) some of these 
fundamentals in order to limit (create) the regional ability to bargain or post a tax. 
However, it seems easier for the central government to limit the capability of a regional 
government from using one of the negotiation tools than creating it. This seems to 
be particularly the case with the bargaining negotiation tool. For if a region were 
effectively using bargaining, it would be probably not so difficult to identify which of 
the fundamentals can be tackled in order to eliminate this way of regional negotiation. 
However, it seems more difficult to identify the particular fundamentals which prevent 
a region from bargaining if presently it is not using it. 
Another concern takes the form of the following question: Is the fact that the central 
government can eliminate the regional capability to do bargaining incompatible with our 
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assumption that the central government cannot see the subsidies given by the regional 
government? Not necessarily. It could perfectly be the case that the central government 
has some power in restricting the regional ability to bargain, but once the region is 
allowed to bargain, it cannot see the subsidy given. Perhaps the reality is somewhere 
in between. However, our assumption allowed us to keep the model simple. 
Nevertheless, it can be sometimes difficult to limit (enable) the regional bargaining 
capability without also limiting (enabling) the posted tax one and vice versa. Arguably 
this could be an additional limitation to the central government capability in determin- 
ing the regional negotiation mechanism. One extreme example is the case of a country 
having to take a decision of becoming a federal or unitarian one. It is obvious that a 
mere administrative decentralization would neither be able to bargain nor to post a tax. 
Then, if this were the only option for a country, it would be equivalent to an option 
where the country has to choose between the mixed and posted tax mechanisms9. 
Finally, assuming that the central government can choose not only the particular tax 
to be set on the MNC but also the particular regional negotiation mechanism, we can 
make the following summary. On the one hand, for those parameter values where the 
bargaining mechanism strictly dominates the posted tax one, it is the best mechanism. 
For from proposition 23 we know that it also strictly dominates the mixed one. On the 
other hand, for those parameter values where the posted tax mechanism dominates the 
bargaining one, it is not a dominated one. For, from proposition 20 we know that the 
posted tax mechanism is not dominated by the mixed one. Thus, we can conclude that, 
for the central government, the mixed negotiation mechanism is not expected country's 
welfare superior to the possibility of choosing between the bargaining and posted tax 
mechanisms. That is, if the parameter values were such that the bargaining mechanism 
strictly dominates the posted tax one, the best thing the central government could do is 
to choose the bargaining mechanism. On the contrary, if the parameter values were such 
that the posted tax mechanism dominates the bargaining one, the central government 
would be indifferent between the posted tax and mixed negotiation mechanisms. 
Thus, as it is clear in the previous paragraph, our model not only determines the op- 
timal tax policy in each particular mechanism, but also which is the optimal mechanism 
"For, given that the central government posts a tax. we know from proposition 5 that a posted tax 
mechanism can be one where the regional government can neither bargain nor post a tax. 
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under particular parameter values. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The present chapter is an extension of the previous one. A new negotiation mechanism 
was analysed, which is a combination of the two mechanisms considered in the previous 
chapter. In this new mechanism the region can choose between using bargaining or 
posting a tax. In fact this is the only difference with the previous chapter. For all the 
other assumptions of the model remain the same. 
We have suggested that this mixed negotiation mechanism could be sometimes the 
most appropriate one for interpreting how countries negotiate with MNCs. 
The main results stem from the comparison between the mix negotiation mechanism 
and the other two mechanisms. The most important one is that for those parameter 
values where the bargaining mechanism is welfare superior to the posted tax one, we 
also find that the addition of the posting tax tool to the regional options not only 
cannot increase the expected country's welfare, but it reduces it in some cases. It seems 
striking that the addition of another negotiation tool to the region reduces the expected 
country's welfare. We have shown that the reason for this result is that the existence 
of a regional choice between bargaining and posted tax creates a conflict of interests 
between the region and the central government. That is, it is optimal for the country 
that the bargaining strategy is used in order to attract both MNCs but not for the 
region. On the contrary, we saw that this conflict of interests does not exist in the 
bargaining and posted price mechanisms. 
We also saw that the mixed negotiation mechanism dominates the posted tax one. 
However, a marginal miss-precision in the setting of the central government tax could 
result in a much lower expected country's welfare than the equilibrium one. For, it 
would make the region choose a strategy that is not optimal for the country. Still, as it 
is clear in proposition 29, the mixed negotiation mechanism dominates the posted tax 
one only under a very narrow and not very likely range of values. 
Another interesting characteristic of the present model is that it provides clear policy 
recommendations. On the one hand it determines the optimal central government tax 
policy under each of the considered negotiation mechanisms. On the other hand, it also 
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establishes the optimal negotiation mechanism under specific parameter values, what is 
useful in the case the central government of the country has some control of it. 
However, the following question remains: What is the policy recommendation if the 
central government only has a limited ability of limiting the region from using one or 
another negotiation tool. We cannot give an answer to this last question without further 
developing the present model. In fact this is an interesting question that encourages 
further research. Last but not least, we recognise that an important limitation of the 
models of the present and previous chapters is the fact that they can only be applied 
to a country with only one region. That is, there was no consideration of the effects 
stemming from the inter-regional competition. The analysis of this competition will be 
the main aim of the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Competition between regions 
under the bargaining mechanism 
5.1 Introduction 
It is well known that, in order to take advantage of positive externalities, local jurisdic- 
tions are willing to offer subsidies with the aim of attracting new production plants to 
their site. This results in MNCs holding simultaneous negotiations with different local 
jurisdictions' authorities within a given country to find out which one offers the most 
profitable conditions for the installation of a new production plant'. 
In the present chapter we are interested in the particular case where the central 
government of the country intervenes in this competition process in order to protect 
the national interest. To the best of my knowledge, Adams and Regibeau (1998) is 
the only paper that considers such a central government intervention. In a context of 
the tariff-jumping argument for FDI and the possibility that the local authorities offer 
subsidies in order to attract MNCs, their paper tries to determine what the optimal 
import tariff is. Indeed, a puzzling stylised fact is that central governments favour some 
regions and not others even when they are similar in terms of, say, level of development 
and strategic location. 
The widespread use of special economic zones by countries all around the world is an 
important evidence for this type of asymmetric treatment. The privileges that these spe- 
'However, a similar situation could be found in the new economic blocs like the EU, \ AFTA, or 
nlercosur, where the jurisdictions are the countries that form the blocs. 
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cial economic zones enjoy give them significant competitive advantages relative to other 
non-favoured areas2. Indeed, the best example of this particular asymmetric treatment 
can be found in China, where at the beginning of the 1980's the central government 
gave special economic privileges to three cities in Guangdong, one in Fujian, and none 
in Guangxi (see Litwack and Qian, 1998). In this case the asymmetric treatment was 
applies even though there was no apparent difference between the three regions in terms 
of development or strategic location. Another more recent but less successful example 
is the creation of three special economic zones in Russia in 1997 (i. e. in the Kalin- 
ingrad, Nakhodka, and Ingushetia regions). Thus, knowing that a symmetric treatment 
of similar regions would be desirable in terms of a more even regional development, why 
the asymmetric policy is chosen instead? Is it because it generates a higher aggregate 
welfare than the symmetric one? 
The main purpose of the present chapter is to show that, under certain circum- 
stances, this is indeed the case. The principle underlying this result in our model is 
that an asymmetric tax treatment of similar regions is more effective than a symmetric 
one in reducing the adverse effect that the subsidy competition between the regions has 
on the expected country's welfare. For in some circumstances, it reduces the bargaining 
power of the MNC. 
Another worth mentioning result that emerges from our model is that, under some 
circumstances, the optimal central government policy generates a mismatch between a 
particular region and a MNC. By mismatch we mean a situation where, even though 
one MNC is more productive in one region, due to the central government's optimal 
policy it goes to the other one. The existence of mismatches contrasts with the solution 
when there is no central government intervention, in which case this never happens. 
This interesting result stems from the fact that in our model, because of imperfect 
information or non-verifiability, the central government cannot tax-discriminate the 
different types of MNCs that are coming to the country. This implies that the taxes 
set ex-ante by the central government have to be conditional on the regions ultimately 
chosen by the MNC and not on their own type. Then, the central government faces a 
trade-off between reducing the inter-region subsidy competition and achieving the best 
'According to the ILO database (1993) the number of, what they call. export processing zones and 
the number of countries hosting them, have expanded rapidly. Thus, there are now more than 1000 
export processing zones spread around more than 100 countries and employing more 40 million people. 
73 
match between region and MNC. In some situations the achievement of the former target 
gives rise to a mismatch. This result seems to support the critical view emphasising 
that privileges given to particular regions are made at the cost of creating inefficiencies 
in the regional allocation of resources. However, in our model, this comes as a result of 
the central government applying a expected country's welfare maximising policy. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 
2. The first part of this section assumes one country with two identical regions, but the 
regions are allowed to differ in the second part. In Section 3 the main results of the 
model are discussed. Section 4 concludes. 
5.2 The model 
We assume a two-stage game involving the central government, two regions (i. e. 1 
and 2), and an MNC. In the first stage, the central government determines the lump 
sum taxes to be imposed on the MNC3 in each of the regions in order to maximise 
the expected country's welfare, which is equal to the local welfare (externality minus 
regional subsidy) plus the central government tax. In the second stage, the MNC 
bargains with the two regional governments on the level of the lump sum subsidies to 
be paid by the winning region. Initially we assume that the MNC makes no pre-subsidy 
profit and it only generates positive externalities to the host region. Each regional 
government maximises its own profit, which is equal to the externality produced by the 
MNC minus the subsidy'. Suppose that, in this stage of the game, all players have 
perfect information. This means that the externality produced by the MNC in each 
region, the taxes imposed by the central government in the first stage of the game, 
and the payoff that the MNC obtains if it does not invest in the country are common 
knowledge. For simplicity, the later is assumed to be zero. 
To model the three-player bargaining process in which each regional government 
bids a lump-sum subsidy to attract a MNC, we use a version of the non-cooperative 
bargaining approach developed by Bolton and Whinston (1993). In our context, this 
3As it was the case in chapter 3, whether the central government tax is on the NINC or on the region 
does not make any difference in terms of the payoff the IRIN C and the regions get. 
As in chapter 3 we are assuming that the regional governments do not consider the central govern- 
ment tax revenue in their own utility function. 
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is an alternating-offers framework where the ZINC alternates in making offers with the 
two regions. When it is the MN C's turn to make an offer. it can demand either a 
particular subsidy from one of the regions or it can make no demand. When it is the 
regions' turn to make an offer, they simultaneously bid the subsidy they are willing to 
pay. The result of this bargaining framework is that the SIN C's payoff is the maximum 
between: a) half of the after-tax surplus (i. e. externality minus central government tax) 
it produces in the winning region; and b) the value of its outside option, which is the 
after-tax surplus it produces in the other region. In other words, the MNC gets half 
of the winning region after-tax surplus when the outside option is not binding and the 
value of the outside option when it is binding. Let us show the result of this bargaining 
in a numerical example 
Example 30 Assume the MNC produces an externality of 40 in region 1 and one of 20 
in region 2. Then, on the one hand, let's assume that the central government taxes are 
20 and 15 in regions 1 and 2 respectively. In this case the after-tax surpluses are equal 
to 20 and 5 respectively and so region 1 would be the winner of the MNC new production 
plant. Indeed, because the outside option is not binding, region 1 and the MNC would 
equally divide this after-tax surplus and get a payoff equal to 20 each. 
On the other hand, if the central government taxes were 20 and 5 in regions 1 and 2 
the after-tax surpluses would be equal to 20 and 15 respectively. Again, region 1 would 
be the winner of the MNC new production plant but, because the outside option is now 
binding, it would have to pay the MNC a subsidy of 15, which is the value of this outside 
option. Thus, the payoffs are 15 for the MNC and 5 for the winning region. 
5.2.1 Two identical regions 
The simplest case is when there is only one type of MNC and both regions are identical. 
In this case the externality produced by the i vINC is the same in both regions. 
On the one hand, in the absence of central government intervention, the competition 
between the regions induces them to offer a subsidy equal to the full externality produced 
by the MNC. Thus, the MNC obtains a benefit equal to the total externality and each 
region gets zero. The expected country's welfare is obviously also zero. 
On the other hand, in the presence of central government intervention, it is optimal 
for it to eliminate one region from the competition (by setting a very high tax if the 
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M'C chooses this region) and to charge the '-%I' . \C a tax equal to the externality 
it 
produces in the other region. We will call this an "asymmetric tax policy" 5. Then, the 
benefit of the externality is totally appropriated by the country. 
In the previous example there was only one type of MNC. However, as we have 
already justified in chapter 3 it is usually the case that a variety of MNCs are involved 
in negotiations with the different regions of a country. To consider this, we allow the 
existence of two types of MNCs (i. e. a or b), which can produce different externalities, 
but the regions are still identical. Indeed, we assume that an MNC of type a shows up 
with probability p and an MNC of type b does it with probability 1-p. Furthermore, 
it is appropriate to think that since the taxes are set in advance, it is difficult for the 
central government to `tax-discriminate' between the two types of MNCs. Thus, as 
before, it can only set the taxes conditional on the region the new plant is built, but 
not on the MNC's type6. 
Again, in the decentralised solution (the one without central government interven- 
tion), the subsidy competition allows the MNC to obtain the full benefit of the exter- 
nality whatever its type is. Thus, there is no country's welfare derived from the new 
production plant. However, when the central government intervenes it is natural to 
think that, given that both regions are identical, it should apply a symmetric tax pol- 
icy. It also seems reasonable to conjecture that the optimal central government policy 
is to eliminate one of the regions from the competition and to apply an appropriate tax 
on the other one (asymmetric tax policy). Indeed, it could be the case that both tax 
policies are equally optimal. In order to know which one of these alternatives is the right 
one under each particular setting we use two numerical examples. In both examples we 
assume that an MNC of type a generates an externality of £40 and an MNC of type b 
one of £20. 
Example 31 In the first case we additionally assume that the probability of an MNC 
5 Under the present case, this same result can be obtained by a "symmetric tax policy", which consists 
in charging the same tax in each region. Indeed, this tax must be equal to the externality produced by 
the MNC. 
6As in the previous chapters the fact that the central government cannot tax discriminate between 
the two types of MINCs can be justified by assuming that the type of AINC is a non-verifiable variable. 
However, in the context of the present chapter we can also assume that the central government has 
imperfect information. That is, it does not know the realisation of the M C*s type and only knows that 
an 1NINC of type a shows up with probability p and an MINC of type b does it with probability 1-p. 
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of type a showing up is high (say p=0.8). If this is the case. it pays to get the 
full externality from the MNC of type a. even though this is done at the cost of not 
attracting the MNC of type b. Thus, the optimal central goz'ernment tax in each regiout 
in the case of the symmetric tax policy, or in the non-eliminated region in the case of 
the asymmetrical one, is equal to the externality produced by the MNC of type a (L40). 
Now, the MNC of type b does not come to the country under any of the tax policies, but 
the full externality is extracted from the MNC of type a. Then, both a symmetric and 
asymmetric tax policies are equally optimal for the country. 
However, a different result is obtained in the next example. 
Example 32 In this second example we assume a low enough p (say p=0.2) as to 
make it optimal for the central government to attract both types of MNCs. Let us first 
obtain the expected country's welfare under the asymmetric tax policy. In this case the 
central government eliminates one region from the competition (say region 1) and it 
charges a tax equal to the externality produced by the MNC of type b (C20) in the re- 
maining one. As a result, the central government obtains the full externality produced 
by an MNC of type b. However, the MNC of type a bargains with the region 1 how to 
share the after-tax surplus of £20 (equal to the externality minus the central government 
tax in this region). As a result of this bargaining process, region 1 only obtains half of 
this after-tax surplus, for it has to give a subsidy of 110 to the MNC. This means that 
the country's welfare is £30 (externality minus subsidy) when an MNC of type a shows 
up and X20 when an MNC of type b does it. 
Let us now obtain the expected country's welfare under the symmetric tax policy. In 
this case, the optimal central government tax in each region is equal to the externality 
produced by an MNC of type b. As before, the central government obtains all the ex- 
ternality produced by an MNC of type b. However, in the case that an MNC of type a 
shows up, the competition between the regions makes the MNC obtain the full after-tax 
surplus of £20. Thus, the expected country's welfare is equal to £20 whichever type of 
MNC shows up and the symmetric tax policy is dominated by the asymmetric one. 
Thus, the following proposition applies. 
Proposition 33 When there are two identical regions, two types of MNCs that produce 
different cxtrr71oli-tics, a m! it is optimal for the country to attract both of them, a dis- 
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similar treatment of similar regions is the only optimal tax policy. For, it reduces the 
subsidy competition when the low type of the MNCs shows up. 
It is interesting to see that in some situations a symmetric treatment of identical 
regions is not an optimal policy. The reason for this is straightforward. It is true that 
setting a tax equal to the externality produced by an MMNC of type b in both regions 
reduces the inter-region competition when this type of MNC shows up. However, this 
policy is not very effective for an MNC of type a. For it makes the MNC's outside 
option to bind and consequently increases the subsidy that the winning region has to 
pay. In other words, the advantage of the asymmetric treatment over the symmetric 
one when there are two MNC's types is that, in some situations, the former reduces the 
subsidy competition when the high type MNC shows up, but the later fails in doing so. 
5.2.2 Two different regions 
Although the explanation of the stylised fact that the central governments give asym- 
metric treatments to similar regions is the main aim of the chapter, it is interesting to 
know what we can learn from it when the regions are not similar. So we now examine 
the central government's optimal policy in a more general setting. 
Until now we have assumed that the MNCs do not have any profit. However, 
given that the addition of MNCs profits makes the model a more general one without 
increasing its complexity, hereafter we will do so. Then, the surplus that an MNC of 
type i produces in region j (s2j) is equal to the sum of its profit and the externality (7r2j 
and eil respectively). 
It is obvious that because of the existence of two types of MNCs and two regions, 
there will be now twelve different `economic regimes'. However, because of symmetry it 
is enough to only consider the following six: 
Economic regime I: sal > Sa2 ý 8b2 
-> 
sbl ý o 
Economic regime II : sal ý Sa2 % 8b1 
-> 
Sb2 -*> 0 
Economic regime III : sa, l > Sb2 > sa2 > Sbl >0 
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Economic regime IV : Sal > Sbl ý Sa2 -> 
Sb2 >0 
Economic regime V: sal ý 8b1 ý 8b2 ý 8a2 ý0 
Economic regime VI : Sal ý Sb2 ý 8b1 ! Sa2 ý0 
The fact that we only need to look at six economic regimes will significantly simplify 
our task. 
We begin solving the second stage of the game by making a definition. When an 
MNC of type i (i=a, b) shows up, we define a region j as 'superior' if the after-tax 
surplus in this region is higher or equal than in region k7 (i. e. sib - gi > sik - gß)8. 
In addition, if this after-tax surplus is higher or equal than the surplus abroad (i. e. 
sib > gj), this region would be the winner of the MNC of type i. Then, the equilibrium 







Sik - gA) if 82j > gj 
0 otherwise 
When region j is the winner the first line of expression 5.1 applies. Then, because of 
the results of the Bolton and Winston's bargaining model already explained in page 4, 
the MNC payoff would be equal to the maximum between half of the after-tax surplus 
an MNC of type i produces in the region j (i. e. si'2 93) and the value of its outside 
option given by the after-tax surplus it produces in region k (i. e. sek - gk). On the 
contrary, if the central government tax on the superior region is such that the after-tax 
surplus in region j is lower than the surplus abroad the MNC does not come to the 
country (i. e. there is no winner region) and it gets a payoff of zero. 
It is obvious that the tax that the winning region must charge is such that, the M 'NC 
For simplicity we will consider the subscripts j and k as indicating the superior and inferior regions 
respectively. 
Furthermore, for simplicity we assume that if the previous weak inequality is satisfied with an equal 
sign, region j is the superior one. 
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gets the payoff in expression 5.1. Thus, the equilibrium tax is: 
- max (7fij - 9j 
s )- Zo 
2 
gj 
; (7fij 9j) - 
(sik 
- 9k) if Sij % gj 
tij = (5.2) 
0 otherwise 
Again, if the central government tax in the superior region is too high the -'\I-NC 
does not come to the country and the tax effectively charged is equal to zero (as it is 
the case in the second line of expression 5.2). In the first line of expression 5.2 and when 
the outside option is not binding it is like if the winning region takes the full after-tax 
profit (7rij - gj) from the MNC, but then it compensates the MNC by giving back the 
payoff in expression 5.1. This guarantees that the MNC gets the payoff in expression 
5.1. A similar reasoning applies when the outside option is binding. It is obvious that 
the tax in expression 5.2 can be a negative one (i. e., a local subsidy) and in a lot of 
cases this will be the case9. 
Then, by adding the equilibrium tax to the externality in region j (i. e. eil) we get 




Sij - 9j - (sik - 9k)) if sij > gj 5.3 
0 otherwise 
We have already determined all the important analytical expressions of the second 
stage of the game. In the first stage the central government maximises the expected 
country's welfare. Thus, given that the ex-post country's welfare produced by each 
particular type of MNC that builds a plant in the country is equal to the central gov- 









saj - 9j - 
(sak 
- 9k) p if saj > 9j 5.4 
0 otherwise 
+ 
9.7 + min 
(3; 
Sbj 9j - (sbk - 9k))) (1 - P) ifsb. 7 >-9j 
10 otherwise 
9As an example, think of the case where there is no central government tax and no profit (the surplus 
is just equal to the \I N C's externality). Then, for the region to get half of this surplus, it has to give a 
subsidy to the NINC the NINC. 
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The previous expression will be useful in order to accomplish our next task. which is 
to find the optimal central government policy. That is, we need to find the expressions 
for gi and 92 that maximises the expected country's welfare. It is obvious that this 
optimal central government policy is conditional on the particular values taken by the 
parameters (i. e. Bai, Sa2, Sb2, sb1 and p). 
Furthermore, given the existence of two MNC types and two different regions there 
are eight possible matches between regions and MNCs that can be achieved as a result 
of the central government intervention. That is: a) to attract only one MNC (a or 
b) to a particular region (1 or 2); b) to attract both MNCs to region 1; c) to attract 
both MNCs to region 2; d) to attract the MNC of type a to region 1 and the MNC 
of type b to region 2; and e) to attract the MNC of type b to region 1 and the MNC 
of type a to region 2. Thus, an easy way of searching for the optimal tax policy is 
to first obtain the optimal central government set of taxes for each of these matches 
(conditional optimums). Then, for each specific parameter values, the maximum of 
these conditional optimums is the unconditional central government optimal policy. 
The conditional optimums are obtained in the following 6 propositions. 
Tax policy 1 
Proposition 34 When the country only attracts one type of MNC, the optimal tax 
policy (hereafter tax policy 1) is one that extracts the entire surplus from an MNC of 
type a in region 1 and eliminates region 2 from the competition (i. e. gl = Sal and 
92 = 00 10)" 
Proof. When the country only attracts one type of MNC, the MNC can be of type 
a or b. If, on the one hand, only an MNC of type a is attracted, it is optimal to eliminate 
region 2 and make it go to region 1 because it generates a higher surplus there. Then, 
the optimal tax in region 1 is one that extracts the full surplus produced by this -IN C 
(i. e. 91 = Sal. 
On the other hand, it is not optimal for the central government to only attract the 
MNC of type b. First, it is not possible to only attract the MNC of type b and make 
it go to region 1. For, every region 1 tax that is accepted by an MN C of type b is also 
10In fact in ordfr to Eli1o 7? otE region 2 from the competition it is enough if 92 > Sb2. 
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accepted by an --%I-NC of type a, what means that both types of -%I\ 
Cs are attracted. 
Second, it is not possible to only attract the M- NC of type b and make it go to region 2 
in economic regimes I, II, and IV. because, again, every tax that is accepted by an -'\I' -\-C 
of type b will also be accepted by an N1'-\'C of type a, what will attract both ýI\ Cs to 
the country. Indeed, given that we attract the MNC of type b to region 2 in economic 
regimes III, V, and VI, it would be possible and optimal to also attract an MNC of type 
a to region 1. Thus, we conclude that it is not optimal to only attract the '\IN C of type 
b.   
Then, by replacing tax policy 1 into expression 5.4 the expected country's welfare 
is: 
ewl = sale 
Tax policy 2 
(5.5) 
Proposition 35 When the country attracts both MNCs and they go to region 1, the 
optimal tax policy (hereafter tax policy 2) is to eliminate region 2 from the competition 
and to set 91 = sbl " 
Proof. First, it is obvious that the two MNCs will not go to region 1 if the tax in 
this region is gl > sbl. Second, given that region 2 is eliminated from the competition, 
a reduction of gl below Sbl would reduce the expected country's welfare whichever type 
of MNC shows up. Finally, given that the central government sets gl = sbl, it is not 
optimal not to eliminate region 2. For this region would become a binding outside 
option, for one or the other MNC depending on the parameter values, what would 
reduce the expected country's welfare.   
By replacing tax policy 2 into expression 5.4 the expected country's welfare is: 
- 





Tax policies 3a and 3b 
Proposition 36 1171en the country attracts both MNCs to region 2, the optimal tax 
policy i. 5 to clinlinate region 1 from the competition and to set 92 = sb2 (hereafter tax 
policy 3a) if 1a2 > Sb2 (i. e. in economic regimcs I. II, and IV) or 92 = sn2 (hereafter 
tax policy 3b) if sae < sbz (i-(,. in economic regimes III, V. and VI). 
8.2 
Proof. First, to eliminate region 1 from the competition and to charge 92 > 8b2 
when sae > sb2 or to charge g2 > sat when Sa2 < 42, does not attract both M\Cs 
to region 2. Second, to charge a tax g2 < sb2 or not to eliminate region 1 from the 
competition when sae > Sb2 results in a lower expected country's welfare. Finally, to 
charge a tax 92 < Sa2 or not to eliminate region 1 from the competition when sae < Sb2 
also result in a lower expected country's welfare.   
The expected country's welfare under tax policies 3a and 3b are respectively given 
by the following expressions: 
ew 
Sa2 - Sb2 1- if s Sa2 5. r 3a = Sb2 +2P+ sb2 ý pý b2 
ew3b = Sa2 + 
Sb2 - Sa2 
2 
)P+8a2(' P) if Sb2 > Sa2 (5.8) 
Tax policy 4 
Proposition 37 If sb2 < sae (i. e. in economic regimes I, II, and IV) and sal - sae - 
Sb1 + Sb2 > 0, the optimal tax policy (hereafter tax policy 4) that attracts an MNC of 
type a to region 1 and one of type b to region 2 is one that sets gl = 8a1 - sa2 + 92 and 
92 = Sb2 
Proof. On the one hand, for an MNC of type a to go to region 1 the two following 
conditions are necessary. 
Sal - 91 ý Sa2 - 92 
(5.9) 
Sal - 91 >_ 0 (5.10 
The first of these conditions says that the after-tax surplus of an MNC of type a 
must be higher in region 1 than in region 2. The second one imposes that the tax 
charged in the region 1 has to be low enough as to make the MINC of type a prefer 
region 1 to going abroad. 
On the other hand, the similar conditions are necessary for an 'XINC of type b to go 
to region 2. These conditions are given by the following expressions: 
Sb2-92ýsb1-91 (5.11) 
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Sb2 - 92 ý0 (5.12) 
Then, by replacing 5.9 into 5.11 and rearranging we get the following necessary 
condition for a tax policy to induce an -NI NC of type a to go to region 
1 and an NEW 
of type b to go to region 2: 
Sal - sat - 5b1 + Sb2 ý0 (5.13) 
On the one hand, it is clear that restriction 5.13 is always satisfied in economic regime 
I, but this is not always the case in economic regimes II and IV. However, assuming 
that restriction 5.13 is satisfied, the maximum tax that can be applied in region 1 that 
is compatible with restrictions 5.9 and 5.10 is, 
gi = min Sal - Sa2 + 921 sal (5.14) 
but because of restriction 5.12 and that we are assuming sb2 < sa2, this is equivalent to: 
91 = sal - Sa2 + 92 (5.15) 
On the other hand, because of 5.12 and 5.15 and given that an MNC of type a has 
to go to region 1 and one of type b has to go to region 2, a reduction in 92 bellow Sb2 will 
decrease the expected country's welfare whichever type of MNC shows up. For when 
an MNC of type b shows up, it is obvious that a reduction in 92 reduces the expected 
country's welfare because, under the present tax policy, this type of MNC goes to region 
2. Furthermore, when an MNC of type a shows up, a reduction in g2 produces a fall 
in gl and so a reduction in the expected country's welfare. Thus, we can conclude that 
given gi = Sal - Sa2 + 92, it is optimal to set 92 = 3b2. 
Similarly, given g2 = 8b2, a reduction in gl bellow gl = Sal - Sa2 + 92 would not 
increase the expected country's welfare if an MNC of type b shows up. Indeed, it would 
reduce it if an ZINC of type a shows up. This means that, if 92 = sb2.91 = sal - sa2 +92 
would be the optimal tax to be set in region 1.   
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- Sb2)) P+ Sb2 
(1 
- p) if Sb2 < Sa2 5.16 
= 
Sb2 (1 - p) if Sb2 > sa2 
tax policy 5 
Proposition 38 If sb2 > Sa2 (i. e. in economic regimes III, V, and VI), the optimal 
tax policy (hereafter tax policy 5) that attracts an MNC of type a to region 1 and an 
MNC of type b to region 2 is one that sets gl = Sal and 92 = 8a2" 
Proof. Because we are looking for the optimal tax policy that results in the MNC 
of type a going to region 1 and the MNC of type b to region 2, restrictions 5.9,5.10, 
5.11,5.12 and 5.13 have to be satisfied. However, given that now we assume Sb2 > 8a2, 
restriction 5.13 is always satisfied. 
As before, the maximum tax that can be applied in region 1 such that the MNC of 
type a chooses this site is given by expression 5.14. Indeed, since the application of this 
tax does not upper bound the tax to be charged in region 2, this is the optimal tax to 
be set in region 1. For a higher tax would not be able to attract an MNC of type a to 
region 1, and a lower one would produce a lower expected country's welfare when an 
MNC of type a shows up and it would not produce a higher one when an MNC of type 
b does it. 
Furthermore, it is optimal for the central government to set 92 = Sb2 and extract the 
full surplus of an MNC of type b in region 2. For a higher tax would fail in attracting 
an MNC of type b to region 2 and a lower one would reduce the expected country's 
welfare whichever MNC shows up. Then, given that this is the optimal tax in region 2, 
the expression 5.14 turns into gl = sal.   
Then, by replacing tax policy 5 into expression 5.4 the expected country's welfare 
is: 
ew 5 
Sa1P + sb2(1 - p) if 5b2 > Sa2 5.17 = 
sale if 5b2 C Sa2 
"Expression 5.16 shows that the country's welfare in the case an NINC of type a shows up is only 
given by gl. This is explained by the fact that the after tax surplus generated by an : SINC of type a in 
region 1 is equal to the outside option and so the region 1 has to allow the MNC to appropriate all of 
this after tax surplus by charging a tax equal to zero. 
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It is obvious that when Sb2 < Sa2 tax policy 5 is a special case of tax policy 1. 
Indeed, in order to be more precise let's make the following definitions, which will also 
be useful later on: 
Definition 39 We will define a tax policy as dominated if there are no parameter values 
for which this tax policy provides the highest expected country's welfare. 
Definition 40 We will define a tax policy as regime-dominated in a particular economic 
regime if there are no parameter values, compatible with this economic regime. for which 
this tax policy provides the highest expected country's welfare. 
Then, we can say that tax policy 1 is dominated by tax policy 5. This is the case 
because when sb2 < sa2 tax policy 5 produces the same expected country's welfare than 
tax policy 1. However, when 8b2 > sa2 tax policy 5 produces a higher welfare. 
Hereafter and for the sake of clarity we adopt the following terminology: We refer 
to tax policy 5 as tax policy 5a when Sb2 > Sa2 and as tax policy 5b when sb2 sa2" 
Indeed, we will ignore tax policy 1 and refer instead to tax policy 5b. Furthermore, it is 
obvious that tax policy 3b is regime-dominated in every economic regime (by tax policy 
3a in economic regimes I, II, and IV and by tax policy 5a in economic regimes III, V, 
and VI). Thus, this tax policy is a dominated one and so can be disregarded. 
Then, we continue with proposition 7: 
tax policy 6 
Proposition 41 It is not optimal for the central government, under any economic 
regime, to attract both an MNC of type a to region 2 and an MNC of type b to region 1. 
Proof. Similarly to our proof to proposition 37, for the MNC of type b to go to 
region 1 and the MNC of type a to go to region 2 the four following conditions are 
necessary: 
8b2 - 92 Sbl - 91 5.18) 
91 < Bbl (5.19) 
Sa2 - 92 ý Sal - 91 
(5.20) 
92 Sa2 (5.21 
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Then, by replacing 5.18 into 5.20 and rearranging we get the following inequality: 
Sal - sat - Sbl + Sb2 <0 (5.22) 
Thus, the present tax policy is feasible only if restriction 5.22 is satisfied. However, 
restriction 5.22 is never satisfied in economic regime I, III, V, and VI and so we only 
need to look at economic regimes II and IV. 
From restriction 5.19 we know that the maximum tax that can be imposed in region 
1 is 91 = Sbl. Furthermore, if 5b2 < Sa2 (which is the case in economic regimes II and 
IV), the maximum tax in region 2 that satisfies restriction 5.18 is 92 = Sb2. In other 
words, it must be the case that gl < Bbl and 92 < 8b2. 
However, the taxes in regions 1 and 2 must not be lower than Sbl and s62 respectively. 
In the case of the tax in region 1 we have that, since we are looking for a case where an 
MNC of type b goes to region 1, a reduction of gl below sbl would produce a fall in the 
welfare obtained from an MNC of type b. Indeed, by increasing the value of the outside 
option for an MNC of type a, a reduction in gi below sbl would also make necessary 
to reduce the tax in region 2 producing a lower country's welfare when this last MNC 
shows up. The same argument applies to explain the fact that it is not optimal to 
reduce the tax in region 2 bellow sb2. 
Then, from the previous two paragraphs we get that the optimal tax policy to achieve 
this particular match between MNCs and regions is to set gi = sbl and 92 = Sb2. 
Now, to find out what the expected country's welfare is under this tax policy we 
need to know whether the outside options are binding or not. On the one hand, it is 
obvious that, since gl = sbl and 92 = 42i region 2 does not constitute a binding outside 
option for an MNC of type b12. On the other hand, region 1 will not be a binding 
outside option for an MNC of type a if the following inequality applies. 
Sa2 - 92 
2> Sal - 91 
(5.23) 
Moreover, by replacing gi = Sbl and 92 = 8b2 into 5.23, and rearranging we get the 
12 Region 2 is not a binding outside option for an SINC of type b if sb`2 9t > Sb2 - 92. 
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following expression. 
G0 2Sal - 28b1 + 8b2 - Sa2 (5.24) 
Thus, when inequality 5.24 is not satisfied in economic regimes II and IV, region 1 
is a binding outside option for an MNC of type a. In this case the expected country*s 
welfare is: 
ew = [Sa2 - Sb2 - sal - Sbl) 
]J+ Sbl (1 - p) (5.25) 
But this is lower than the one in expression 5.5 for every parameter values in eco- 
nomic regimes II and IV where the expression 5.24 is not satisfied. On the contrary, 
when inequality 5.24 is satisfied in economic regimes II and IV the region 1 is not a 
binding outside option for an MNC of type a. In this last case the expected country's 
welfare is given by the following expression. 
sa2 - sb2 
ew6 =2 )P+sbl(l-P) (5.26) 
But, in economic regime II and IV this expected country's welfare is lower than the 
one in expression 5.6. Then, we can conclude that tax policy 6 is a dominated one and 
so it is not optimal to attract an MNC of type a to region 2 and an MNC of type b to 
region 1.   
Then, in order to know the precise parameter values for which each of the previous 
five tax policies is the optimal one, a comparison of the expected country's welfare 
generated by each of them has to be done. However, in order to prove that tax policies 
2,3a, 4,5a, and 5b are not dominated ones, in figure 5-1 we provide five numerical 
examples respectively showing that each of the five tax policies is the optimal one for 
at least some parameter values. 
Furthermore, some of the implications of the previous six propositions are sum- 
marised in table 2. That is, for each tax policy (column 1) we specify the tax imposed 
in each region (columns 2 and 3) and the distribution of the MNCs between the regions 
(columns 4 and 5). Indeed, in column 6 we also list the specific economic regimes for 




Parameter values Country's welfare 
under tax olic : 
Sal 'a2 Sb, Sb2 p 2 3a 4 5a 5b 
2 40 12 20 5 0.5 25 6.75 19 20a 
3a 40 38 7.6 20 0.5 15.7 24.5 21 20a 
4 40 20 7.6 19 0.5 15.7 19.3 29 20a 
5a 40 5 10 30 0.2 13 27.5 24 32b 
5b 40 30 10 5 0.5 17.5 11.3 10 20a 
Notes: a) Notice that in this case we have Sb2 < Sa2 ; b) Notice that in this 
case we have sb2 > sa2 . 
Figure 5-1: Numerical examples proving that tax policies 2,3a, 4,5a, and 5b are the 
optimal ones for some specific parameter values 
5.3 Results 
The first result of this chapter was stated in proposition 1 at the beginning of our 
model. By this proposition, we were able to explain the stylised fact that central 
governments give asymmetric tax treatments to similar regions. It seems puzzling that 
in some situations a symmetric treatment of identical regions is not an optimal policy. 
As we already saw, the reason for the advantage of the asymmetric treatment over the 
symmetric one when there are two MNC's types is that, in some situations, the former 
reduces the subsidy competition when the high type MNC shows up, but the later fails 
in doing so. It is important to notice that this result crucially depends on the fact 
that the central government does not have perfect information about the type of MNC 
showing up. For if this were not the case both policies would get the entire surplus 
produced by both MNCs. 
Some other results can be derived from table 5-2. One of them is that depending 
on the values taken by the parameters, the spectrum of central government optimal tax 
policies can be reduced to only four. Indeed, in the optimum the following matches 
between region and 'XINC are the only possible ones: only a ? vIN C of type a is attracted 
and it goes to region 1; both I\INCs are attracted to region 1 or 2; or the MTNC of type 





Tax imposed on each 
region 









2 91= Sb, 92 = 00 a, b I, II5 IV, and V 
3a 91 _ g2 = 5b2 a, b Ia 
4 g1 = Sal - (Sa2 - g2) g2 = Sb2 a b I, 11b , 
and IV 
5a 91 = Sal g2 = Sb2 a b III5 V, and VI 
5b 91 =Sal 92 =CO a I, II, and IV 
Note: The superscripts a and b on the number identifying the economic regime 
specifies the type of MNC for which the particular tax policy does not 
reach the best match between region and MNC. 
Figure 5-2: Tax policies that are not regime dominated 
Another implication is that when one of the regions does not get any MNC it is 
optimal for the central government to eliminate this region (i. e. in tax policies 2,3, and 
5b). For, in order to increase the expected country's welfare, it is optimal to prevent 
the loosing region from becoming a binding outside option. However, we should not be 
tempted to think that this is a general result and conclude that in the optimum the 
outside option would never be binding. It is evident that this is not the case in tax 
policy 4. For when this tax policy is the optimal one, region 2 is a binding outside 
option when an MNC of type a shows up. This is the case because the after tax surplus 
in region 1, sal - gl = Sal - sal - (Sa2 - Sb2)) = sa2 - sb2, is equal to the one in region 
2. This is not an obvious result given that the fact that an outside option is binding 
reduces the expected country's welfare. 
We are now in condition to look for the existence of mismatches between regions and 
MNCs produced by the central government policy. Recall that by mismatch we mean a 
situation where, even though one MNC is more productive in one region, it is optimal 
for the country to attract it to the other one. Indeed, the existence of mismatches is an 
interesting result that contrasts with the solution when there is no central government 
intervention, where this never happens. By using a numerical example extracted from 
economic regime I. we can see a case where a mismatch is created. 
Example 42 Assume that sal = 40, sae = 34. Sb2 = 20. Bbl = 10. and p=0.5. In 
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this case, tax policy 3a the central government optimal policy, which eliminates region 
1 from the competition and attracts both MNCs to region 2. 
Then, it is clear that there will be a mismatch between the '-\I- NC of type (l and the 
region 2, for that type of MNC produces a higher surplus in region 1. This is just an 
example of the existence of a mismatch, but as it is stated in the note to figure 5-2. 
it could also appear in economic regimes II, IV, and V. The mismatches are produced 
because the central government faces a trade off between reducing the negative effects 
the inter-region subsidy competition has on the expected country's welfare and reaching 
the best match between region and MNC. More specifically, the impossibility of tax- 
discriminating between the different types of MNCs leaves the central government with 
only two tools (the taxes in each of the two regions, i. e. gl and 92) to reach four targets 
(to achieve the best match between regions and MNCs and to extract the full surplus 
that each MNC produces in its best match). This problem would not have existed if the 
central government had perfect information. For in this case it could have set the taxes 
conditional on both the region and the MNC's type (i. e. gal, ga2,9b1, and gb2), in which 
case the central government would have had four tools. As a result each type of MNC 
would have gone to its best matching region and the full surplus would be extracted by 
the central government. 
Finally, another interesting result of the present model is that, as it is obvious in 
figure 5-2, the after-tax surplus will be positive only when tax policies 2,3a, or 4 are 
the optimal ones and always in the case an MNC of type a shows up. This also implies 
that there will be no after-tax surplus in economic regimes III and VI. That is, when 
the highest two surpluses are produced by the MNC of type a in region 1 and the MNC 
of type b in region 2, in that order. In other words, when each region has advantage 
only for the MNC from which it gets the highest surplus (MNC a for region 1 and b 
for region 2), which we can identify as a case of regional high specialisation and low 
competition. An extreme example of this particular case would be when the regions are 
dissimilar but perfectly symmetric (e. g. the MNC of type a produces 40 in region 1 and 
0 in region 2 and the MNC of type b produces 0 in region 1 and 40 in region 2). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
With the aim of analysing a very important aspect of the last 20 years we have developed 
a simple model where an MNC bargains with two local governments to decide the 
location of its new production plant. The creation of a positive surplus to the host site 
induces the local governments to get involved in subsidy competition. It is clear that 
this competition reduces the benefits of the winning region in favour of higher profits 
for the MNC, with the consequent reduction in the expected country's welfare. Thus, 
it is natural to ask: Why does the central government not eliminate or at least limit 
this competition? 
In fact, as we have already mentioned in the introduction, there is some evidence 
suggesting that central governments are intervening in this competition process. The 
clearest example is the persistence with which central governments give asymmetric tax 
treatments to similar regions, what became the main motivation for the present chapter. 
In our model a central government that cannot tax-discriminate between the differ- 
ent types of MNCs moves first by setting the taxes to pay in each region. Then, at the 
time a particular MNC has to decide where to build a new production plant, it bargains 
with the two regions the amount of subsidy to be paid. We have solved the model and 
found some interesting results. We find that it is optimal for the central government 
to give relative advantages to some regions in order to reduce the inter-region compe- 
tition and to increase the expected country's welfare. This result seems to justify the 
widespread existence of the so-called special economic zones or other economic regimes 
that create asymmetries between the regions of a particular country. Indeed, it is the 
case that under some particular conditions an asymmetric treatment of similar regions 
is the only optimal policy. For when there are two types of MNCs and it is optimal for 
the country to attract both of them, a similar tax treatment makes the losing region 
become a binding outside option for the high type MNC, increasing in this way the 
subsidy paid by the winning region. 
We also find that in several occasions the central government intervention generates 
a mismatch between regions and 1NCs. This mismatch is produced when, even though 
one ZINC is more productive in one region, it is optimal for the country to make it go 
to the other one. It is striking that, in our model, the existence of mismatches comes 
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as a result of the central government applying a policy that maximises the expected 
country's welfare. 
Let us take a look at what drives this last result. The mismatches are produced 
because the central government faces a trade off between reducing the negative effects 
the inter-region subsidy competition has on the expected country's welfare and reaching 
the best match between region and MNC. More specifically, the fact of not being able 
to apply tax-discrimination between the different types of MNCs leaves the central 
government with only two tools to reach four targets. Thus, we can say that, given 
that the subsidies are not observable, this result is driven by the fact that the central 
government cannot tax-discriminate between the different MNC types. 
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Chapter 6 
Competition between regions 
under the mixed negotiation 
mechanism 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have seen how the inter region competition works in a setting 
where the regions can only use bargaining. In this one we work on a model where there 
are two regions choosing between the bargaining and posting tax strategies. In this 
respect the present chapter is an extension of the mixed negotiation mechanism of 
chapter 4 to a case where there is competition between regions. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 introduces the model. Section 2 
analyses an inter-region competition in a setting with only one type of MNC in a mixed 
negotiation mechanism without central government intervention. This setting is inter- 
esting by itself but also as an intermediate step in order to have a better understanding 
of the setting where there are two types of MNCs and central government intervention. 
Under the former setting there are multiple equilibriums, but all these equilibriums 
are output equivalent. This means that the taxes set by both regions and the payoff 
obtained by them and the ININC do not change between equilibriums. Moreover, the 
posting tax strategy is always an equilibrium one and the expected country's welfare is 
higher under this setting than in one where the two regions can only use the bargaining 
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strategy. 
In section 3 we move on to analyse a mixed negotiation mechanism inter-regional 
competition in a setting with two MNCs, two identical regions, and central government 
intervention. In order to get a better understanding, we look first at a case with only 
one region and go onto a more complex one where there are two identical regions. The 
main results are that, under certain parameter values, the addition of a second identical 
region to the country increases the expected country's welfare. The reason for this result 
is that the existence of a second identical region provides the central government with 
an additional negotiation tool. That is, the competition from the second region can be 
used by the central government in order to prevent the first region from using a strategy 
that is not the optimal one for the country. 
Section 4 concludes. 
6.2 The model 
In the present section we will use a three stage game similar to the one described 
in chapter 4. However, there will be two regions instead of one. That is, we assume a 
three-stage game involving the central government, two regions, and a MNC. In the first 
stage, in order to maximise the expected country's welfare, the central government posts 
a lump sum tax to be paid by the MNC. In the second stage the regional government 
choose their optimal taxing strategy. That is, whether or not to post a particular tax 
to be paid by the MNC in the third stage. Finally, in the third stage an MNC shows 
up and decides whether to build the new production plant in one of the regions or not 
to stay in the country at all. Depending on the regions choosing bargaining or posted 
tax in the second stage we have three different competitive environments in the third 
stage. 
The first competitive environment is when none of the regions posts a tax. In this 
case the result of the third stage is the one developed by Bolton and Whinston (1993). 
where a three-player bargaining game is solved. As we already saw in chapter 5 the 
result of this bargaining framework is that the MNC's payoff is the maximum between: 
a) half of the after-tax surplus (i. e. surplus minus central government tax) it produces 
in the winning region: and b) the value of its outside option, given by the after-tax 
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surplus it produces in the other region'. A second pair of competitive environments is 
the two symmetric cases where one region uses bargaining and the other tax posting. 
Then, on the one hand, if the winning region were the one using a tax posting, the 
MNC would have to pay the posted tax and get a profit equal to the value of the 
outside option. On the other hand, if the winning region were the one using bargaining 
we apply the traditional Rubinstain bargaining model with outside option, where the 
value of the outside option is equal to what the MNC can get in the other region23. In 
fact, the MNC and regions' payoffs under this bargaining are the same as in the Bolton 
and Whinston (1993) bargaining framework. Finally, when both regions post a tax, 
the MNC just chooses one region and has to pay this region's posted tax. It should be 
obvious by now that when tax posting is used the tax paid by an MNC is independent 
of its type, but this is not the case when bargaining is used. 
6.3 One MNC type 
In the present section we will consider a very simple model with only one type of MNC. 
Note that as a consequence of having only one type of MNC this is a perfect information 
game. This marks a difference with respect to the mixed negotiation mechanism in 
chapter 4 where there were two MNCs. Hence, we can say that in chapter 4 we had an 
imperfect-information mixed negotiation mechanism, but the one in the present section 
is a perfect information one. However, contrary to the case in the previous chapter, in 
the present section the regions can choose between using bargaining and posting tax. 
The main aim of the present section is to find out the equilibrium of the inter- 
region competition of the second stage of the game for the case when there is only 
one type of MNC. Because of this and on the sake of simplicity we assume that the 
central government taxes are gl = 92 = 0. This assumption will be relaxed in the 
next section. Furthermore, following the specification in chapter 5 we know that the 
surpluses produced by the MNC in regions 1 and 2 are sl = 7rl + el and s2 = 7r2 + e2 
respectively with sl > s2. For simplicity we also assume that sl = 100 and s2 = 20, but 
'A more detailed explanation of this bargaining process can be found in chapter 5. 
`'That is, equal to the surplus the MNC produces in this other region minus the central government 
tax and the other region tax. 
'A more detailed explanation of the Rubinstain bargaining process in our context was given in 
chapter 3. 
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without specifying how these surpluses are divided between profits and externalities. 
Because of the previous assumption the result of the game is that the `I\ C always 
ends up building the new plant in region 1. Thus, we will refer to 1 and 2 as the winning 
and loosing regions respectively. Indeed, in order to simplify the analysis let's assume 
from now on that when an MNC is indifferent between region 1 and 2 it chooses region 
1 with probability 1. 
We know that there are two possible environment under bargaining: when the out- 
side option is binding and when it is not. Thus, in the next sub-section we analyse the 
later environment while living the consideration of the former one for section 6.3.2. 
6.3.1 The outside option is non-binding 
Let us first analyse the case where the outside option is not binding, 2> s2. The 
question is: What are the equilibrium regional tax strategies and each player's payoff? 
Case 1: Assume that region 2 plays bargaining. Then, a bargaining strategy would 
give region 1a payoff equal to half of the surplus (i. e. 2= 50). However, given that 
the outside option is not binding, region 1 can do better than that by posting a tax 
that just leaves the MNC with a payoff4 
Yi = S2 = 20 
which is equal to the value of its outside option. 
(6.1) 
It is obvious that the tax that the winning region must post is such that, the MNC 
gets the payoff in expression 6.1. Thus, the optimal regional tax is: 
tl = 7r] - S2 (6.2) 
In expression 6.2 it is like if the winning region takes the entire gross profit from 
the MNC (irl ), but then it compensates the MNC by giving back a subsidy equal to 
the payoff in expression 6.1. Recall that this tax can be a negative one (i. e. a regional 
subsidy) . 
Then, by adding the equilibrium tax from 6.2 to the externality in region 1 (i. e. el) 
'This expression is derived from 5.1 for gl = 92 =0 and eliminating the subscript i because we have 
only one MNC type. 
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we get the winning region's equilibrium payoff: 
zl = el + (7r1 - 82) = Si - S2 
(6.3) 
Case 2: Assume that region 2 posts a tax. It is obvious that any region 2's tax 
t2 > -e2 ' would not be an equilibrium because region 1 would be able to undercut 
this tax such that the MNC just marginally prefers region 1 to region 2. But then, it 
would be optimal for region 2 to also marginally undercut region's 1 tax. This results 
in both regions subsequently undercutting each other. This competition process would 
continue until region 2 cannot make any additional tax reduction. Thus, t2 = -e2 is 
the only equilibrium posted tax for region 26, to which region 1's optimal strategy is to 
post the tax given in expression 6.2. Again, the winning region and the MNCs' payoffs 
will be given by expressions 6.1 and 6.3 respectively. 
Thus, we can conclude that if the outside option is not binding the winning region 
optimal strategy is to post a tax (the in expression 6.2) that leaves the MNC with a 
payoff equal to the value of this outside option. The loosing region has two equally 
optimal strategies, to use bargaining or post a 'subsidy' equal to the externality the 
MNC gets in its location (t2 = -e2). All the possible equilibriums are stated in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 43 When there is only one type of MNC, two regions, and the outside 
option is not binding there are two equilibriums: 1) the winning region posting a tax 
tl = 71 - s2 and the loosing one using bargaining and 2) the winning region posting a 
tax tl = 71 - s2 and the loosing one posting a subsidy equal to the entire externality the 
MNC produces in its site, t2 = -e2. 
Still, the existence of the two equilibriums is not a problem because they are outcome 
equivalent. That is, in both cases the winning region sets the tax in expression 6.2. The 
MNC and the winning region get the payoffs in expressions 6.1 and 6.3 respectively and 
the loosing region gets nothing. 
5 Recall that a negative value of t is a subsidy. 
For it is obvious that region 2 cannot pre-commit to a tax lower than t2 = -ek without having 
looses. 
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6.3.2 The outside option is binding 
Let us analyse now the case where the outside option is binding, that is 2< 82. Again, 
the question is: What are the equilibrium regional tax strategies and each player's 
payoff? 
Case 3: Assume that region 2 plays bargaining. In this case the minimum payoff 
the MNC would accept in region 1 is again the one in expression 6.1 and so the winning 
region equilibrium tax is the one in expression 6.2. For, a higher tax would produce a 
lower profit and a lower one would not be accepted by the MNC. However, the winning 
region can set this tax by using a posted tax or by bargaining and so both strategies 
would be an equilibrium of the game. Thus, the winning region payoff is the one in 
expression 6.3 and the loosing one gets nothing. 
Case 4: Assume that region 2 posts a tax. As in case 2, it is obvious that region 
2's only equilibrium posting tax strategy is t2 = -e2. The minimum payoff the MNC 
would accept is the one in 6.1 and so the winning region equilibrium tax is the one 
in expression 6.2. However, the winning region can set this tax by using a posted tax 
or bargaining and so both would be equilibrium strategies. Thus, the winning region 
payoff is the one in expression 6.3 and the loosing one gets nothing. 
We have obtained that both, bargaining and tax-posting, are equilibrium strategies 
for both regions and so the following proposition applies: 
Proposition 44 When there is only one type of MNC, two regions, and the outside 
option is binding there are four equilibriums: 1) the winning region posting tl = 71 - s2 
and region 2 using bargaining; 2) the winning region posting tl = 7rl - s2 and the loosing 
one posting t2 = -e2; 3) both regions using bargaining; and 4) region 1 using bargaining 
and the loosing one posting t2 = -e2. 
Again, the existence of the four equilibriums is not a problem because they are out- 
come equivalent. That is, in the four cases the winning region sets the tax in expression 
6.2. The MNC and the winning region get the payoffs in expressions 6.1 and 6.3 respec- 
tively and the loosing region gets nothing. Indeed, the last two propositions result in 
the following corollary: 
Corollary 45 I Then there is only one type of MNC, the posted tax tl = 71 - s2 is 
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an equilibrium strategy for the advantageous region independently of the outside option 
being binding or not. 
By now we have assumed that there was no central government intervention. How- 
ever, the introduction of the central government intervention does not produce sub- 
stantial change in the previous conclusions. In fact the only difference is that in the 
previous propositions the surplus to be considered in the negotiation process between 
the MNC and the regions are the ones after the taxes imposed by the central government 
(after-tax surpluses). 
Let us look now then at the differences between the results of this section and the 
case where the inter region competition framework is one where they can only use 
bargaining (the one in chapter 5). As it was stated in section 2 of chapter 5 the result 
of the competition between the regions when they can only use bargaining is that the 
MNC's payoff is the maximum between: a) half of the after-tax surplus (i. e. externality 
minus central government tax) it produces in the winning region; and b) the value of its 
outside option, given by the after-tax surplus it produces in the other region. On the 
contrary as we have seen in the present section, the result of the competition between 
the regions when they can choose between bargaining and posted tax is that the MNC's 
payoff is equal to the outside option given by the 'after-tax surplus' it produces in the 
loosing region. This is the case whether this outside option is binding or not. 
Thus, the results in this section and those in section 2 of chapter 5, allow us to write 
the following two corollaries: 
Corollary 46 When there is only one type of MNC, two regions, and the outside option 
is binding the bargaining and mixed negotiation mechanisms produce the same expected 
country's welfare. 
And 
Corollary 47 When there is only one type of MNC, two regions, and the outside option 
is non-binding the mixed negotiation mechanism produces a higher expected country's 
welfare than the bargaining one. 
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6.4 Two MNC types and two identical regions 
In section 4.3 of chapter 4 we have found that under certain parameter values the 
addition of commitment power to the only region of the country reduces de expected 
country's welfare. Thus, the question is, does this result also applies when there are two 
regions instead of one? At first we would think that the addition of another identical 
region would create harmful competition and so this result should continue applying or 
even increase in intensity. 
However, in the present section we will show that this is not the case. In other 
words, in a mixed negotiation mechanism with two MNCs and only one region, the 
addition of a second identical region increases the expected country's welfare. This is 
a very interesting result because, at first, it seems more reasonable to expect that the 
competition created by the addition of a second region would have the inverse effect on 
welfare. 
In this section we continue assuming a three-stage-game involving the central gov- 
ernment, one region, in subsection 6.4.1 and two regions (i. e. 1 and 2), in subsection 
6.4.1, and two types of MNCs (i. e. a or b). In the first stage, in order to maximise the 
expected country's welfare the central government posts a different lump sum tax (to be 
paid by the MNC) in each of the regions. In the second stage each regional government 
chooses its optimal tax strategy. That is, whether or not to post a particular tax. In 
this last case the region would have to bargain with the MNC in the third stage. Finally, 
in the third stage an MNC shows up and 'negotiates' with the two regions according 
with the strategies chosen by the regions in the second stage. That is, it bargains the 
regional tax or decides whether to accept or reject the posted regional tax. 
We assume that, in the third stage of the game all players have perfect information. 
This means that the surplus produced by the MNC in each region, the taxes imposed 
by the central government in the first stage of the game, the tax strategy chosen by the 
regions in the second stage, and the payoff that the MNC obtains if it does not invest in 
the country are common knowledge. For simplicity, the later is assumed to be zero. On 
the contrary, both the central government and the regions have imperfect information 
at the time of posting a tax7. This imperfect information is modelled by assuming that 
As we already explained in the introduction to the thesis, it would be enough that the '. %I\C type 
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they know the externality each type of -INC can produce, but they do not know the 
realization of the MNC type. In particular, they only know that an M. NC of type a 
shows up with probability p and an IEN C of type b does it with probability 1-p. 
As we already said, we want to show that in a mixed negotiation mechanism with 
two MNCs and only one region, the addition of a second identical region increases 
the expected country's welfare. The best way of showing this result is by a numerical 
example, where we begin assuming the existence of only one region (region 1). 
6.4.1 Numerical example 
Only one region 
Assume the MNCs of type a and b produce respective profits of 7rla = 40 and 7rlb = 30, 
zero externalities, and the probability of an MNC of type b showing up is high enough 
as to make it optimal for the country to attract both MNCs under the bargaining 
mechanism (say 1-p=0.8)8. Thus, under the 'bargaining mechanism' it is optimal 
for the central government to charge a tax g= 7rlb = 30 and the expected country's 
welfare is given by expression 3.8. That is, ew = 35p + 30 (1 - p) = 31. 
On the contrary, we already saw that if the central government sets this same tax 
g= 30 under the mixed negotiation mechanism, the region would have an incentive 
to post a tax that only attracts the MNC of type a. That is, it would be optimal for 
the region to post a tax equal to 10. Thus, the region gets the entire after-tax surplus 
produced by an MNC of type a, but the MNC of type b does not come to the country9. 
In terms of the expected country's welfare this result is the same as the one achieved 
by the central government tax policy that only attracts the MNC of type a. 
From the previous two paragraphs it is clear that the central government would 
prefer the region to choose the bargaining strategy, but the later prefers the tax posting 
one. The conflict of interests is evident. 
The existence of this conflict of interest implies that the central government optimal 
policy is the one inducing the region to implement a posting tax strategy attracting both 
is not verifiable. 
That is, the country's welfare in expression 4.10 is higher than the ones in expressions 4.6,4.7.4.8, 
and 4.9. 
9This strategy gives the region a payoff equal to 10p, which is higher than the payoff obtained under 
the bargaining one (equal to (10/2)p). 
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M! INCs. One way of achieving this optimal policy is by setting gi = 0, what induces the 
region to set tl = 3010. This is the central government optimal policy because, 
from 
expression 4.11 we get that the 'unconditional maximum expected country's welfare' 
is achieved by the implementation of this regional strategy. That is, the 'conditional 
expected country's welfare' provided by this strategy (given in expression 4.8) is higher 
than the one provided by the other ones (given in expressions 4.6,4.9, and 4.10)". 
Thus, the expected regional payoff and expected country's welfare would be given by 
expression 4.3 and 4.8 respectively. 
We have already explained in section 4.3 of chapter 4 that the reason why the 
bargaining strategy is not implemented in this setting is because it is not enough for 
the bargaining strategy to be optimal for the country, but it has to be also optimal for 
the region. However, we will show now that the existence of a second identical region 
allows the central government to make the bargaining strategy, which is the optimal 
one for the country, to be the optimal one for the first region as well. This is achieved 
by reducing the payoff the region 1 gets from the implementation of the tax posting 
strategy only attracting the MNC of type a. Indeed, in this particular example the 
addition of the second region does not reduce the expected country's welfare provided 
by the bargaining strategy. That is, the expected country's welfare will be equal to the 
one in expression 3.8. 
Two identical regions 
This section's numerical example consists in adding an identical region to the numerical 
example of the previous section. Then, the new numerical example is: the MNCs of 
type a and b produce respective profits of 71a = 7r2a = 40 and 7rlb = 7r2b = 30, zero 
externalities, and the probability of an MNC of type b showing up is high enough as to 
make it optimal for the country to attract both MNCs under the bargaining mechanism 
(say l-p=0.8). 
'°It is easy to see from expressions 4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4, and 4.5 that a posting tax tl = 30 is the strategy 
giving the highest regional payoff. 
"In the present numerical example the regional tax posting strategy attracting both MNCs provides 
a country's welfare wQ'b 
(°) 
= 30 while the other strategies generate the following country's welfares: 
tca 8, wb''"(°) = 24, and Wa b 
(°) 
= 16. Note that expression 4.7 is not and equilibrium in this 
numerical example because every tax accepted by an ZINC of type b would be also accepted by an MNC 
of type a. 
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We already know from chapter 5 that the central government can choose between 
two possible symmetric tax treatments: symmetric tax treatment 1. gl = 92 = 40; and 
symmetric tax treatment 2, gl = g2 = 30. We also know that the central government 
can treat the regions asymmetrically. In this case the central government eliminates 
region 2 from the competition by setting a very high tax there and set a tax gl = 30 in 
region 112. Let us refer to this as the asymmetric tax treatment 1. The asymmetric tax 
treatment 2 is introduced bellow. Let us analyse each of them in more detail. 
Symmetric tax treatment 1: The first symmetrical tax treatment only attracts 
the MNC of type a. Region 113 gets the MNC and the expected country's welfare is the 
one in expression 3.7 (i. e., ew = 40p). 
Symmetric tax treatment 2: The second symmetric tax treatment attracts both 
MNCs. Region 1 gets both MNCs but, because the competition between the regions is 
though, the expected country's welfare is the one in the following expression 
ewa b= SbP + Sb (1 - P) = Sb a, b (6.4) 
It is obvious that this expected country's welfare is lower than the one given by the 
bargaining mechanism when both MNCs are attracted, (given in expression 3.8). 
Asymmetric tax treatment 1: On the contrary, if the central government im- 
plements the asymmetric tax treatment 1 it creates the same setting than in section 
6.3 where there is only one region. As we already saw a tax gi = 30 in region 1 results 
in the bargaining strategy not being implemented by the region. For, it is optimal for 
region 1 to post a tax tl = 71- gl, which is only accepted by the MNC of type a. As in 
the symmetric tax 1 case the country's welfare is ew = (gl + ti) p= (gl + Ira - 91) p= 
SaP = 40p. '4 
Asymmetric tax treatment 2: We will show now that there is another asym- 
metric alternative for the central government, which does completely eliminate region 2 







12In fact it could also set a tax gl = 40 in region 1. However, this tax policy would give the same 
country's welfare than the first symmetric tax treatment where gl = g2 = 40. 
13In order to simplify the analysis let's assume that when an MIN is indifferent between region 1 
and 2 it chooses region 1 with probability 1. 
"Because eQ = 0. 
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Then, on the one hand, when an M. NC of type b shows up the after tax surpluses 
it produces are Sat äl = 7rbl - gl =0 in region 1 and Sat = 71b2 - 92 = -5 in region 2. 
It is obvious that region 2 would not be able to profitably attract the MNC of type 
b. Moreover, we can be certain that a tax tl =0 would attract the -\I- -\'C of type 
b 
to region 1. Recall that we are assuming that if indifferent between coming or not to 
the country, the MNC would choose to come to the country with probability I. On the 
other hand, when an MNC of type a shows up the after tax surpluses it produces are 
sbi =oral - gl = 10 in region 1 and sb2 = 7ra2 - 92 =5 in region 2. 
It is obvious in the previous paragraph that, given that region 2 cannot attract the 
MNC of type b, it should only go for the MNC of type a. However, let us take a closer 
look at the equilibrium of this sub-game. 
Case 1: Let us assume first that region 2 chooses the bargaining strategy. Then, 
the optimal posting tax strategy for region 1 would be to set tl = 515, which provides 
it an expected payoff ezä'ý"z'1 = 5p. Moreover, region 1 would get exactly the same 
expected payoff by choosing a bargaining strategy, = 7rQ1- 1=5 is Pg gYý a, b -2P 
Case 2: It should be obvious that in the case that region 2 chooses to post a tax, 
in equilibrium it would set t2 = 0. Then, region 1's best response is the same as in case 
1. That is, a posted tax tl =5 or bargaining. Moreover, region's 1 payoff is also the 
same as in case 1. 
Thus, in the present numerical example and given gi = 30 and 92 = 35, we have 
the following four second stage equilibriums: 1) region 1 posting tl =5 and region 2 
posting t2 = 0; 2) region 1 posting tl =5 and region 2 using bargaining; 3) region 1 
using bargaining and region 2 posting t2 = 0; 4) and region 1 using bargaining and 
region 2 using bargaining. 
However, as before, the existence of multiple equilibriums is not a problem because 
they are outcome equivalent. That is, in each of the equilibrium region 2 gets nothing 
and region 1 gets an expected payoff ezä'm = ezä'b = 5p. 
Then, it is obvious that for the bargaining to be the only optimal strategy for region 
1 it would be enough for the central government tax in region 1 to be marginally lower 
"'In order to simplify the analysis let's assume that when the NINC of type a is indifferent between 
region 1 and 2, it chooses region 1 with probability 1. 
16In fact, the outside option is just binding because half of the after tax surplus produced by the AINC 
Tui9i 
of type a in region 12= 5p) is exactly equal to the value of the outside option (7ra2 - 92 = 5p). 
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than 30, (say gi = 30 - E). where E is very small. However, because the 
introduction of E 
would result in a more cumbersome explanation, it is better to assume that whenever a 
region is indifferent between using bargaining or posting a tax. it uses bargaining with 
probability 1. 
Then, given that region 1 chooses the bargaining strategy the expected country's 
welfare is 
b, m(c) 71la - gl 
ewa b= 
(\gl +2p+ gl (1 - p) = 35p + 30 (1 - p) (6.5) 
which is obviously equivalent to the one in expression 4.1017. 
Thus, we can express the previous example findings in the following proposition: 
Proposition 48 In a mixed negotiation mechanism with two MNCs and only one re- 
gion, the addition of a second identical region can increase the expected country's welfare. 
The reason for the previous result is that the existence of a second region provides 
the central government with an additional negotiation tool. We have already explained 
in section 4.3 of chapter 4 that one problem of the mixed negotiation mechanism when 
there is only one region is that it is not enough for the bargaining strategy to be the 
optimal one for the country, but it has to be also the optimal one for the region. Hence, 
the central government can use the competition from the second region in order to 
prevent the first region to use the posted tax strategy that only attracts the MNC of 
type a, what under some parameter values provides a lower expected country's welfare 
than the bargaining strategy. As a result, in the previous numerical example, the region 
adopts the bargaining strategy, which is the optimal one for the country. 
Furthermore, it should be obvious that the previous result does not depend on the 
second region being identical to the first one. For example, the result would still apply 
if the MNCs of type a and b produce respective profits of 7rla = 40,7r2a = 30,7rlb = 30, 
and 7r2b = 20, zero externalities, and the probability of an MNC of type b showing up 
is high enough as to make it optimal for the country to attract both MNCs under the 
bargaining mechanism (say 1-p=0.8). For in this case the central government taxes 
gl = 30 and 92 = 25 would produce exactly the same equilibriums than in the previous 
Because 1-p=0.8, the expected country 's welfare in (6.5) is higher than the one in the two 
symmetric tax treatments as well as in the asymmetric tax treatment 1. 
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numerical example and so they would also produce the same expected country's welfare 
than in expression 6.5. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In the present chapter we have worked on a model where there are two regions choosing 
between the bargaining and posting tax strategies. In the first section we have modelled 
the inter-regional competition in a setting with only one type of MMNC in a mixed 
negotiation mechanism without central government intervention. There, we have found 
the existence of output equivalent multiple equilibriums. That is, the taxes set by 
both regions and the payoff obtained by them and the MNC do not change between 
equilibriums. Moreover, the posting tax strategy is always an equilibrium one and the 
expected country's welfare is higher under this setting than in one where the two regions 
can only use the bargaining strategy. 
In the second section of the present chapter we have analysed the same mixed nego- 
tiation mechanism, but allowing for inter-regional competition and central government 
intervention. For simplicity we have assumed two identical regions. We found that 
under certain parameter values, the addition of a second identical region to the country 
increases the expected country's welfare. As we already explained, the reason for this 
result is that the existence of a second identical region provides the central government 
with an additional negotiation tool which can be used in order to prevent the winning 




In the present thesis we have analysed the very well known fact of inter-region compe- 
tition to attract MNCs. In chapters 3 and 4 we have considered a situation where there 
is only one region in the country. We have justified that this is sometimes the case in 
reality. Moreover, the consideration of only one region in these chapters was useful in 
order to understand the more difficult case when there are two regions. This last case 
was analysed in chapters 5 and 6. 
In chapter 3 we have considered the stylized fact that the central government has 
to set the taxes in advance (tax posting), but depending on the negotiation mecha- 
nism, the regional government can either bargain or post a tax, but it cannot choose 
between the two mechanisms. Furthermore, the MNC has to accept whichever negotia- 
tion mechanism is in place and decide whether to establish its new production plant in 
the country. 
Interesting results have been found. In particular, we found that when the region 
also gets externalities in addition to the levied tax, it is not always the case that the 
regional bargaining mechanism dominates the tax posting one. However, we also saw 
that the regional bargaining mechanism is welfare superior to the posted tax one for a 
very plausible range of parameter values which, as in Wang (1995) but in a different 
context, includes the case where the MNCs only produce profits and no externalities to 
the region. 
\Ve have shown that the likelihood that the regional bargaining mechanism domi- 
nates the posted-tax one is higher the higher is the dispersion of the profits and the 
lower is the externality of the high surplus ýMNC with respect to the one produced by the 
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low surplus one. We have also shown that the composition of the surplus between prof- 
its and externalities does not produce any effect on the equilibrium expected country's 
welfare in the bargaining mechanism. However, it does in the posted tax one. 
Other important results were found in chapter 4. They stem from the comparison 
between the mix negotiation mechanism on the one hand and the bargaining and tax 
posting ones on the other. The most important one is that for those parameter values 
where the regional bargaining mechanism is welfare superior to the posted tax one, 
we also find that the addition of the posting tax strategy to the regional options not 
only cannot increase the expected country's welfare, but it reduces it in some cases. It 
seems striking that the addition of another negotiation tool to the region reduces the 
expected country's welfare. We have shown that the reason for this result is that the 
existence of a regional choice between bargaining and posted tax creates a 'conflict of 
interests' between the region and the central government. That is, it is optimal for the 
country that the bargaining strategy is used in order to attract both MNCs but not for 
the region. Recall that this conflict of interests does not exist when the region cannot 
choose between strategies. 
Clear policy recommendations are also derived. On the one hand our model de- 
termines the optimal central government tax policy under each of the considered ne- 
gotiation mechanisms. On the other hand, it also establishes the optimal negotiation 
mechanism under specific ranges of parameter values, what is useful in the case the 
central government of the country has some control of it. 
In chapters 5 and 6 competition was introduced by considering two regions instead 
of one. In chapter 5 we have assumed that each of the regions can only use bargaining 
with the MNCs. We have found that it is optimal for the central government to give 
relative advantages to some regions in order to reduce the inter-region competition and 
to increase the expected country's welfare. This result seems to justify the widespread 
existence of the so-called special economic zones or other economic regimes that create 
asymmetries between the regions of a particular country. Indeed, it is the case that 
under some particular conditions an asymmetric treatment of similar regions is the only 
optimal policy. For when there are two types of MNCs and it is optimal for the country 
to attract both of them, a similar tax treatment makes the losing region become a 
binding outside option for the high type MNC. increasing in this way the subsidy paid 
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by the winning region. 
We also find that in several occasions the central government intervention generates 
a mismatch between regions and MNCs. This mismatch is produced when, even though 
one MNC is more productive in one region, it is optimal for the country to make it go 
to the other one. It is striking that, in our model, the existence of mismatches comes 
as a result of the central government optimal policy. 
The mismatches are produced because the central government faces a trade off 
between reducing the negative effects the inter-region subsidy competition has on the 
expected country's welfare and achieving the best match between region and MNC. This 
result is mainly driven by the central government inability of applying tax-discrimination 
between the different types of MNCs, what leaves it with only two tools to reach four 
targets. 
In chapter 6 we model two competing regions that are able to choose between the 
bargaining and posting tax strategies. We found that under certain parameter values, 
the addition of a second identical region to the country increases the expected country's 
welfare. The reason for this result is that the existence of a second identical region 
provides the central government with an additional negotiation tool which can be used 
in order to prevent the winning region from using a strategy that is not the optimal 
one for the country. That is, the conflict of interests between central and regional 
government is avoided. 
Finally, we should recognise the limitation implied by the section 4 of chapter 6 
assumption that the two regions are identical. Consequently, it seems interesting to 
see if the results of this section still hold in a more general setting. That is, when a 
mixed negotiation mechanism inter-regional competition process is applied to the twelve 
economic regimes of chapter 5. It seems to be that this is a worth doing task. One 
possibility would be to adapt one of the existing models in the posting price versus 
bargaining literature" to the inter-regional competition setting. Indeed, this seems an 
interesting research. However, the complexities involved in developing such a model 
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From expressions 4.6 and 4.25 we know that Sb (1 - p) > sap, what implies that 
3sb(1 - p) > 3sa, p. Then, for inequality 4.27 to be satisfied it has to be the case that 
Sb 1-p -S,, p > O1, what requires p<1 2p) 2 
Then, by multiplying both members of expression 4.25 by (1 - 2p) and given p<2 
we get: 
Sa (-6PP + 2p) > Sb (6pp - 8p + 2) (9.1) 
On the one hand, the probability solving -6pp + 2p =0 is p=3 what, given s, Sb > 0, 
implies that the bracket in the first member of 9.1 is positive for any 0<p<3 and 
negative for any 3<p<22. On the other hand, the roots solving 6pp - 8p +2=0 are 
P1, P2 = 1,3, what implies that the bracket in the second member of 9.1 is positive for 
any 0<p<3 and negative for any 3<p<2. 




(6pp - 8p + 2) (9.2) 
sb (-6pp + 2p) 
Moreover we know that sb(1 - p) > sa, p, what is equivalent to 
(1 p) > sa (9.3) 
P Sb 
'This also implies that the optimal central government tax is positive. 
2 We know that it must be p<2 
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p (-6pp + 2p) 
By multiplying both members by (-6pp + 2p), what we know is positive and rear- 
ranging we get that expression 9.4 can only be solved as an equality. That is: 
(1 p) 
_ 
(6pp - 8p + 2) (9.5) 
p (-6pp + 2p) 





what implies sb(1 - p) = sap. However, if this is the case, expression 4.25 would be 
satisfied as equality and so the mixed negotiation mechanism would not dominate the 
posted tax one. Then, in order for the mixed negotiation mechanism to dominate the 
posted tax one it is necessary that in expression 9.1 -6pp + 2p <0 and Epp - 8p +2<0 
what, as we already said, requires that 3<p<2. 
Furthermore, from expression 3.21 and the fact that Sa > 71b we get: 
ea >p (9.7) 2ea + 7ra 
However, we already know that p>3 and so we get: 
ea > 7ra (9.8) 
Finally, replacing ea > iTQ into expression 3.21 we get: 
(1 
. 9) 7rbý7ra 
+ p) (9 
(1-p) 
The fact that. 3<p<2 implies that expression F'+PI) varies from 2 to 3. Thus, we 
can be certain that lrb > 271a,. 
A2 
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To find the economic regimes for which each tax policy is not regime-dominated 
we proceed by eliminating all the economic regimes where each tax policy is regime- 
dominated. To do this we have to compare the expected country's welfare provided by 
every tax policy in every economic regime. The result is as follows: 
Tax policy 2 is regime-dominated in economic regimes III and VI (by tax policy 5a). 
Tax policy 3a is regime-dominated in economic regimes II and IV (by tax policy 4): and 
in economic regimes III, V, and VI (by tax policy 5a). The application of tax policy 4 
in economic regimes III, V, and VI does not attract the MNC of type a to the country 
and so it is regime-dominated (by tax policy 5a). By definition tax policy 5a can only 
be applied when sb2 ? Sa2 (i. e. in economic regimes III, V, and VI). Indeed, it is not 
regime dominated in these particular regimes. In a similar way, tax policy 5b can only 
be applied when Sb2 Sa2 (i. e. in economic regimes I, II, and IV). Indeed, it is not 
regime dominated in these particular regimes. 
A3 Mathematical derivation of the main expressions 
A3.1 Derivation of expression 3.9 






2p+ 8b(1 - P) 
2p> 
(Sb) 









Sa > Sb - 
p 
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A3.2 Derivation of expression 4.21 








sap+ Sb2(1-p)+ 9 
2 
Then, we know that for bargaining to be the optimal strategy under the mixed nego- 





(1 _P) +2> sap 
A3.3 Derivation of expression 4.22 
2p+ 
Sb 
P) +2> SaP 22 
2p+ 2 
C1 p) 
Sb(1 - p) - SaP sap 2(1 - 2p) 
sap + sb(1 - p) + 
sb(1 P) - SaP > 2SaP (1-2p) 
(1 - p) + 
80 P) - SaP 
sb > gap (1 - 2p) 
sb(l - p)(1 - 2p) + sb(l - p) - sap > sap(1 - 2p) 
8b (1 - p) - 2p86(1 - p) + 8b (I - p) - yap > sap 
(1 - 2p) 
-2psb + 2psbp + 28b - 28bp - sap > sap - 2sapp 
-2psb + 2psbp + 2s6 - 2sbp > 2sap - 2sapp 
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SbpP - 28bp + Sb > saP - sal 
Sb (PP - 2p + 1) > Sa (-PP + P) 
A3.4 The roots after expression 4.22 
2f 22-4.1.1 
P1, P2= 2.1 
2f 4-4 
P1, P2 2 
2±0 
P1, P2 =2 
2±0 1 
P1, P2= 2= 1 
A3.5 The roots after expression 4.24 




P17 P2 4 
3fß 





A3.6 Derivation of expression 9.1 
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8b (1 - p) - sQp + 3sap(1 - 2p) > 38b(1 - p)(1 - 2p) 
Sb - sbp - SaP + asap - 3sap2p > (3sb - 3sbp)(1 - 2p) 
Sb - sbp + 2sap - 6saPP > (3sb - 3sbp) - 2p (3sb - 3sbp) 
Sb - sbp + 2sap - 6sapp > 38b - 3SbP - 6pSb + 6sbPP 
2sap - 6sapp > 2sb - 8sbp + 6sbpp 
-6saPP + 2sap > 68bPP - 8sbp + 2Sb 
Sa (-6pp + 2p) > Sb (6pp - 8p + 2) 
A3.7 The roots after expression 9.1 
8 82-4.6.2 
P1, P2= 2.6 
8f 64-48 
Pi, P2 = 12 
8± 16 
P1, P2 12 
8±4 1 
P1, P2 = 12 _ 1 
3 
A3.8 Derivation of expression 9.5 
(1 - p) > 
(6pp - 8p + 2) 
p- (-6pp + 2p) 
(1 -p) (-6PP+2p) ? p(6pp - 8p+2) 
(1 -p)(-Epp+2p) >p(6pp-8p+2) 
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(-Epp+2p) -p(-Epp+2p) > p(6pp - 8p+2) 
(-6p+2) - (-6pp+2p) ? (6pp- 8p+2) 
-6p +2+ 6pp - 2p > 6pp-8p+2 
-8p ? -8p 
A3.9 Derivation of expression 9.7 
71b(l-p) >71a+eap 
Sa(1-p) ý: ita+eaP 
(71a + ea) (1 - pA >_ 7ra + eap 
(7ra + ea) - (7ra + ea) p> ira + eap 
ea - (7Va + ea) p> eap 
ea - 7Tap > leap 
ea > 2eaP + 7raP 
ea >p (2ea + 7ra) 
ea 
2ea + 7Ta 
A3.10 Derivation of expression 9.8 
ea 1 
Zea + 7fa 3 







ea - 3-ea >3 Ira 
11 
Sea>37Ta 
ea > 7T a 




7b > 7Fa 
(1 -1ý) 
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